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"GREAT EXPECTATIONS" DEFEATED?: THE
TRAJECTORY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
REGIMES IN CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES POST-NAFTA
Eric Tuckert

I.

INTRODUCTION

Ironically, the study of globalization's impact on the performance
of labor markets and labor market regulation has generated a new
industry that has provided work to a small army of researchers for
more than a decade.' So it was with some trepidation that I decided to
join their ranks, even if only for a short tour of duty, especially in light
of the heated conflicts among these scholars who are drawn from a
variety of disciplines and come with sharply divergent normative
commitments.
From the beginning of the free-trade era2 the impact of trade
liberalization on labor law was hotly contested.3 Opponents of

t Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada. Scholar-inResidence, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland University (2004-2005). An earlier
version of this paper was delivered in February 2005 as part of the Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law Employment and Labor Speaker Series. The paper was written while I was a scholar in
residence at Cleveland Marshall, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the then
Dean, Steven Steinglass, my colleagues, and the staff for their warm welcome and assistance. I
would also like to thank Judy Fudge, Harry Glasbeek, Leah Vosko, and the three anonymous
reviewers for their helpful comments. Financial support was provided by the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council, Grant 410-2002-1169.
1. A crude indicator of the growth of this industry can be gleaned from searches I
conducted on two electronic indexes (ASAP Academic-an interdisciplinary index-and the
Index to Legal Periodicalsand Books) of the term "globalization and labor." From 1980 (when
both indexes begin) to the end of 1989 there were 4 (1+3) such references. From 1990 to
December 6, 2004 there were 1494 (508+986). I will leave it to economically-inclined readers to
decide whether the shift of resources into the globalization research industry has increased
aggregate welfare.
2. For the purposes of this paper, the free-trade era begins with the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter CUFTA], incorporated into
the North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the
Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States, Dec. 17, 1992, 1994 Can. T.S.
No. 2, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Hereinafter I
will just refer to NAFTA unless CUFTA is being discussed separately.
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NAFTA (and some supporters) predicted a regulatory race to the
bottom (RTB) would ensue, leading to increasingly deregulated labor
markets. The result would be weaker collective bargaining laws,
lower minimum standards, and a decline in the social wage. In recent

years a number of scholars have examined this prediction in light of
more than fifteen years' experience under CUFTA and ten under

NAFTA and there seems to be a growing consensus that, contrary to
those "great expectations," labor laws in North America have not
been significantly weakened
This article re-examines the effects of NAFTA on collective

bargaining law in Canada and the United States.5 Its contribution to
the debates comes down to two points. On the one hand, it argues
that the emerging consensus understates the impact of NAFTA-style
trade liberalization on the legal regulation of collective bargaining

because its focus is artificially narrow. In reaching their conclusions,

''new consensus" scholars have looked exclusively at changes in
private sector collective bargaining legislation. This article argues that
their approach produces a misleading picture of the impact of trade

liberalization because it omits public sector collective bargaining and,
more importantly, it fails to consider the impact of trade liberalization
on the effectiveness of statutory collective bargaining schemes. If the
focus is broadened to include public sector bargaining and labor law's

effectiveness, then one finds that there has been more labor market
deregulation than consensus scholars acknowledge.
On the other hand, the article accepts that, even after broadening
our analytical lens, the downward trajectory of the collective
bargaining regime has not been as steep as many RTB theorists
predicted. It argues that the model upon which their predictions were

3. These debates are reviewed by Brian A. Langille, Canadian Labour Law Reform and
Free Trade, 23 OTrAWA L. REv. 581, 592-608 (1991) and George W. Adams, The U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement and Collective Bargaining,14 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 41, 46-52 (1988).
4. For a review of the literature, see Kevin Banks, Globalization and Labour StandardsA Second Look at the Evidence, 29 QUEEN'S L.J. 533 (2004) (Banks challenges emerging
consensus that globalization has no negative impact on labor standards). See also Michel
Gauvin, Labour Legislation in Canada: Major Developments and Trends, 1989-2003 (Ottawa:
Labour Law Analysis, Strategic Policy and International Labour Affairs, Labour Program,
Human Resources and Development Canada, Oct. 3, 2003); Parbudyal Singh, NAFTA and
Labor: A Canadian Perspective,23 J. LAB. RES. 433 (2002) (short review of changes in Canadian
labor laws and standards largely based on secondary sources from the mid-1990s); Pierre Verge,
How Does Canadian Labour Law Fare in a Global Economy?, 42 J. INDUS. REL. 275 (2000).
5. The restriction of my focus to collective bargaining is prudential. In principle a proper
assessment of NAFTA's effects should encompass all the strands of labor market regulation, but
that is too large a project for an article. My decision to exclude Mexico from this analysis was
partly prudential and partly based on the fact that its very different legal traditions, labor market
organizations, and institutional arrangements would greatly complicate the comparison.
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based was overly structural and that a more nuanced one is needed.
Such a model must better take into account a range of factors that
mediate the impact of NAFTA-style trade liberalization on labor
market regulation. These mediations occur at the economic level,
within the collective bargaining regime itself, and in the external
environment that shapes the direction of state action.
The paper is organized as follows. The remainder of the
introduction addresses some preliminary and methodological issues.
Part II presents and criticizes the RTB model and suggests an
alternative, more nuanced model of the impact of trade liberalization
on labor market regulation. Part III uses that model to explore
developments in the collective bargaining regimes of Canada and the
United States. Part IV offers some brief concluding observations.

The debate over the impact of free trade agreements had both an
empirical and a normative dimension. The empirical question was
whether, under a free trade agreement that left each party at liberty to
change its domestic labor standards (including collective bargaining
laws, minimum standards laws, anti-discrimination law, workers'
compensation laws, occupational health and safety laws, and
unemployment insurance), labor markets would become less
regulated. To greatly simplify, critics of the free trade agreements
embraced the RTB hypothesis, as did some supporters.6 Most free
traders, however, rejected this hypothesis, arguing variously that the
prisoners' dilemma that underpins the RTB analysis did not apply,
that progressive competitiveness strategies could yield mutual gains
for labor and capital, or that the positive effect of free trade on
economic development would promote upward harmonization
The normative dimension of the debate was launched from the
implicit premise that labor market regulation would be weakened
under free trade. The question was whether that would be an
undesirable outcome. Again, to greatly simplify, for free trade critics,
the answer was clearly that weakened labor market regulation would
6. See, e.g., Ian Robinson, How Will the North American Free Trade Agreement Affect
Worker Rights in North America?, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN NORTH AMERICA 105 (Maria Lorena Cook & Harry C. Katz eds., 1994).
7. For a useful survey of the competing views, see Morely Gunderson, Harmonization of
Labour Policies under Trade Liberalization,53 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 24 (1998); Brian
Langille, Competing Conceptions of Regulatory Competition in Debates on Trade Liberalization
and Labour Standards, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION

479 (William Bratton et al. eds., 1996).

COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:97

be undesirable since it would undermine labor law's social justice
objectives: worker participation and voice achieved through collective
bargaining would be undermined, as would protection against low
wages, long hours of work, discriminatory treatment, unhealthy and
unsafe working conditions, and the risk of income disruption due to
injury, illness, or unemployment. Supporters of liberalized trade and
regulatory competitiveness, on the other hand, viewed the question
through the lens of comparative advantage and efficiency. If
competition in product markets is a good thing, then so too is
competition among producers of regulatory policy. Jurisdictions may
choose to have sub-optimal (e.g., unduly high) labor standards if that
is the will of the electorate, but in a free-trade regime they will have to
bear more of its cost (lower investment), as capital exits to
jurisdictions with more favorable regulatory regimes. If the threat of
capital flight induces voters in otherwise pro-regulatory jurisdictions
to choose more optimal (e.g., lower) standards that give them a
comparative advantage, then this is a good outcome. It is just another
dimension of achieving net welfare gains through trade based on
comparative advantage. Certainly right-wing think tanks that ardently
support free trade routinely make the claim that high labor standards,
including minimum wage laws and collective bargaining laws,
negatively affect competitiveness and, therefore, should be reduced.8
This article focuses on the empirical dimension of the debate
rather than the normative one, but it is worth noting that the
normative defense of regulatory competitiveness reveals that
NAFTA-style trade liberalization is appropriately understood as an
"ambitious attempt to enlist external markets to obtain political
ends" 9 and should be viewed as part and parcel of a larger neo-liberal
political project that aims to alter the balance of power between class
forces and shift the role of the state from ameliorating the
dysfunctional consequences of markets through social democratic or
Keynesian welfarist policies to the promotion of global
competitiveness. In this way, NAFTA creates a "conditioning

8. See, e.g., Jason Clemens & Mark Mullins, Dangers in Rigid Labour Laws: Ministers
Regulation, available at
Labour Market
Propose Prescriptive Changes to
(critique of proposed
http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/shared/readmorel.asp?sNav=ed&id=317
federal labor law reforms based in part on concern about regulatory competition).
9. Daniel Drache, Dreaming Trade or Trading Dreams: The Limits of Trade Blocs, in
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION 417, 418 (William Bratton
et al. eds., 1996).
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framework" that is intended to influence the policy choices of citizens
and government. °
Finally, it is difficult to make an overall assessment of the
trajectory of Canadian collective bargaining law because courts have
held that constitutional jurisdiction over labor and employment rests
primarily with the provinces." As a result, the federal government's
Canada Labour Code 2 only applies to about ten percent of the labor
force, while the laws of the provinces or territories govern the
remaining ninety percent. In theory it is possible to construct
numerical indices that reflect changes in each jurisdiction over a
fifteen-year period and then arrive at a quantitative national
assessment of the trajectory of Canadian labor law. 3 This article
adopts a different approach based on a qualitative assessment of
changes in Canada's three largest jurisdictions-Ontario, British
Columbia, and Quebec-which contain among them about eighty
percent of the labor force. Mention will be made of developments in
other Canadian jurisdictions as appropriate. There is less of a problem
with American labor law because of federal preemption in the area of
private sector collective bargaining. State and local law, however,
largely governs public sector collective bargaining, outside of the
federal civil service.
II. MODELING NAFTA's IMPACT
A.

The Race to the Bottom Model

Figure 1 presents a model of the RTB hypothesis. Essentially, it

predicts that trade liberalization's effects on the economy and on
institutions will promote downward regulatory competition.

10. Ricardo Grinspun & Robert Kreklewich, ConsolidatingNeoliberalReforms: Free Trade
as a ConditioningFramework, 43 STUD. IN POLITICAL ECON. 33 (1994).
11. Toronto Elec. Comm'rs v. Snider, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5.
12. Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. L-2 (2005).
13. For an ambitious attempt to create such indices, see RICHARD N. BLOCK ET AL.,
LABOR STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research 2003).
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Figure 1
Model of the Race to the Bottom Theory
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In terms of economic effects, the argument is that removing tariff
and non-tariff barriers to trade and guaranteeing the security of
investor rights against adverse state action increases capital and
product mobility. NAFTA clearly accomplished this result (at least in
principle) by phasing out remaining tariffs between the member
countries and by eliminating the need for various import licenses and
other non-tariff barriers. As well, it protects NAFTA investors by
guaranteeing national treatment (treatment no less favorable than
that given to national investors), most-favored nation status
(treatment no less favorable than that given to foreign investors of a
third country), and property rights against expropriation or
nationalization (or measures having equivalent effect). It also creates
an investor-state disputing process that permits NAFTA investors to
bring complaints to an international tribunal with binding arbitration
powers."
The increased mobility of capital and products enhances
competition between employers who are forced to continually seek
ways to produce more efficiently lest a lower-cost producer displace
them. Labor is one factor of production that will be affected by this
intensified competitive struggle. Employers in a more competitive
environment will seek to increase labor productivity by lowering unit

14. Robinson, supra note 6, at 106-08.
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labor costs. This can be accomplished by reducing the cost of
employing a given quantity of labor or by increasing the amount
produced by that same quantity of labor, or, most likely, by some
combination of the two (lower labor costs/higher productivity).
Because capital is mobile, it will move to jurisdictions where it
can produce most efficiently. These choices will depend in part on the
natural and infrastructural advantages of different locations, but
governments will also adopt measures to maximize their attractiveness
to existing and prospective investors. Strong, comprehensive, and
well-enforced labor standards will not be attractive, as studies have
shown that many employers and multinational buyers perceive that
higher standards result in competitive disadvantage.15 States that have
high standards, therefore, will be pressured by employers to lower
them,16 while states that have weak labor standards will, at the very
least, be disinclined to improve them, and, at worst, be driven to
reduce them even further to meet the competition from states that are
weakening theirs. Workers' organizations will be less able politically
to resist labor market deregulation in this environment because of the
greater weight of market discipline on state action. As well, their
ability to organize and17their economic leverage will be reduced by the
threat of capital flight.
This model assumes that trade liberalization occurs within a
particular institutional framework, one in which regulatory authority
over labor markets remains local while capital is free to move outside
the regulation-producing jurisdiction.
If different institutional
arrangements were created to coordinate the production of labor
market standards among jurisdictions, or to create a new global
regulation-producing authority then the regulatory competition would
end, and the market for labor market standards would cease to
operate, or at least be constrained.
What, then, are the institutional arrangements made by NAFTA
for labor market regulation? NAFTA itself has little to say on social
matters, except in the preamble where the parties resolve to "create
new employment opportunities and improve working conditions and
living standards in their respective territories" and to "protect,
15. Kimberly Ann Elliot, Labor Standards, Development and CAFrA (Inst. for Int'l Econ.,
International Economics Policy Briefs, No. PB04-2, Mar. 2004).
16. See, e.g., Guylaine Valde & Jean Charest, Globalizationand the Transformationof State
Regulation of Labour: the Case of Recent Amendments to the Quebec Collective Agreement
Decrees Act, 17 INT'L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 79 (2001).
17. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers,
Wages, and Union Organizing (U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission, Commissioned
Research Paper, Sept. 6, 2000).
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enhance, and enforce basic workers' rights., 18 These are not,
however, enforceable obligations. For this we must turn to the North
American Accord on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), 19 or labor side
accord, concluded after NAFTA was signed. 20 NAALC sets out
eleven guiding principles that the signatories undertake to promote,
subject to each party's domestic law. The first three relate to
collective action: freedom of association and protection of the right to
organize; the right to bargain collectively; and the right to strike.
In addition to setting out principles, the NAALC requires each
government to comply with and enforce its own labor laws. It
establishes the Commission on Labor Cooperation, which is mandated
to promote cooperative activities aimed at advancing the goals of the
NAALC, but is not given enforcement powers. For this purpose, the
NAALC requires each signatory to appoint a National Administrative
Office (NAO) and provides that a complaint alleging that a country is
failing to enforce its own laws can be filed with the NAO of another
country. If the complaint is accepted, an investigation is conducted
and if the NAO finds that the laws are not being enforced, it may
request ministerial consultations. Complaints related to the three
collective action principles cannot be taken further if a resolution is
not reached at this stage. Complaints related to the other principles
may be referred to an Evaluation Committee of Experts but only
complaints regarding occupational health and safety, child labor, or
minimum wages laws can go before an arbitration panel vested with
power to impose penalties for non-enforcement.
As many commentators have noted, while the NAALC expresses
the parties' commitment to set basic labor rights, it does not require
them to provide them in law. Rather, it simply requires the parties to
enforce their existing laws. In marked contrast to the trade-related
provisions of NAFTA, which give investor rights priority over state
sovereignty, the NAALC gives national sovereignty priority over
labor rights. Each party retains the "right to establish its own

18. NAFTA, supra note 2, at preamble, available at http://www.nafta-secalena.org/DefaultSite/index-e.aspx?DetaillD=79.
19. North American Accord on Labor Cooperation [hereinafter NAALC], Sept. 13, 1993,
U.S.-Mex.-Can., available at http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml.
20. On the background to the negotiation of the NAALC, see Kate E. Andrias, Gender,
Work, and the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, 37 SAN FRAN. L. REV. 521, 530-43 (2003); Rainer
Dombois, Erhard Homberger & Jens Winter, TransnationalLabor Regulation in the NAFTA A Problem of Institutional Design? The Case of the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation between the USA, Mexico and Canada, 19 INT'L J. CoMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL.
421, 425-28 (2003); JOHN R. MACARTHUR, THE SELLING OF "FREE TRADE": NAFTA,
WASHINGTON, AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).
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domestic labor standards,
21 and to adopt or modify accordingly its labor
laws and regulations.
These constitutive arrangements create the conditions for
regulatory competition described in Model 1: at the economic level,
increased capital and product mobility generate more intense
competition that gives capital greater economic leverage over labor; at
the institutional level, labor standards are set nationally or subnationally, depending on the constitutional arrangements of each of
the signatories, but not at a transnational level that coincides with the
boundaries of capital and product markets. Moreover, mechanisms to
encourage each jurisdiction to enhance, protect, or even enforce
workers' rights are weak.
According to this model pressure will be greater on those states
and jurisdictions with higher labor standards and most dependent on
trade. A recent study created a quantitative index of labor standards
in the United States and Canada. Not surprisingly, it found that
overall Canada had higher labor standards than the United States and
that the difference was particularly large in regard to collective
bargaining laws.22 Further, Canada is the most trade dependent of the
OECD countries. Its exports as a percentage of gross national
product in 1995 was 33.5 while that of the United States was 8. The
OECD average was 23.1%.23 As a result, this model predicts that the
pressure on Canadian collective bargaining law will be particularly
strong.
B.

The RTB Model's Limitations

Recent literature examining the impact of liberalized trading
regimes on regulation suggests that races to the bottom do not
necessarily follow and that a variety of politico-economic processes
contribute to regulatory outcomes. 4 Some studies have illustrated
this point through an examination of an analogous situation, labor
market regulation in federal states. A brief comparison of the United
States and Canada, two federal states with very different

21. NAALC, supra note 19, at art. 2. Clyde Summers, NAFTA's Labor Side Agreement and
International Labor Standards, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 173 (1999); Emmanuelle
Mazuyer, Labor Regulation in the North American Free Trade Area: A Study of the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,22 COMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 239,245 (2001).
22. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 13, at 95 (the comparison year was 1998).
23. NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS 203 (2001).
24. For example, see the essays collected in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001).
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constitutional divisions of powers over labor and employment law, is
suggestive.
In the United States, the courts held that the federal
government's National Labor Relations Act substantially pre-empted
state jurisdiction, thereby limiting the opportunity for regulatory
competition between states to occur. 25 This was partially undone by
the Taft-Hartley Act,26 which permitted states to enact "right-towork" laws that weakened union security. A number of states
exercised this power, particularly in the southern United States. That
change, in conjunction with fierce employer resistance to
unionization, racism, and disunity in the labor movement resulted in
low union densities in southern states. Although the spread of right to
work laws slowed in the 1960s, their significance grew as employers
became more aggressive in pursuing non-union production strategies.
One strategy was to shift investment to greenfield sites, often located
in right-to-work states. These trends intensified in the 1980s, when
northern and Midwestern states lost 1.5 million manufacturing jobs
and $40 billion in pay, largely to right-to-work states.27
Internal regulatory competition, however, cannot be invoked as
the principal reason for the weakness of U.S. labor law. Barenberg
emphasizes other factors, including economic competition, ineffective
coordination mechanisms, and the role of local state law. Economic
competition remained intense because of the extremely fragmented
bargaining structure institutionalized under the NLRA and because
employers were free to divest from unionized plants and reinvest in
non-union ones. Coordinating mechanisms that might have overcome
this fragmentation (such as peak union and employer associations,
national political parties, etc.) were too weak to play this role. Finally,
local elites, particularly in the south, were able to mobilize state and
local power to defeat the exercise of federally guaranteed core labor
rights. The result was a centralized but ineffective legal regime.2"

25. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2005).
26. Labor-Management Relations (Taft Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2005).
27. MICHAEL HONEY, SOUTHERN LABOR AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS (1993); THOMAS A.
KOCHAN, HARRY C. KATZ & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1994); RICK FANTASIA & KIM VOSS, HARD WORK 74-75 (2004).

28. Mark Barenberg, Labor Federalism in the United States: Lessons for Coordinated
Decentralization in Supranational Regimes, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION 111 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001). See also Bruce Elmslie &
William Milberg, Free Trade and Social Dumping: Lessons from the Regulation of Interstate
Commerce, CHALLENGE 46 (May-June 1996) (arguing that the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act eliminated socially destructive regulatory competition over child labor laws) and Lane
Kenworthy, Economic Integration and Convergence: A Look at the U.S. States, 80 SOC. SCI. Q.
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Canada presents an interesting comparison.
As mentioned,
courts have held that federal jurisdiction over labor and employment
is very limited, leaving regulatory authority vested in the provinces.
This constitutional arrangement favors regulatory competition, since
capital is fairly free to move between provinces. Yet, there has not
been a race to the bottom. For example, within a few years after the
federal government's industrial relations legislation was struck down
in 1925, nearly all the provinces either opted into the federal scheme
or created equivalent mechanisms of their own. As well, within a few
years after the end of World War II, all the provinces adopted a
version of the U.S. style collective bargaining law introduced by the
federal government pursuant to its emergency powers. 29 Because of
the apparent absence of regulatory competition, the effect of
federalism on the development of Canadian labor law has received
little scholarly attention. In his book Reconcilable Differences Paul
Weiler briefly argues that the provinces have served as "laboratories
for legal experimentation" that generally led to positive innovation.
The reason for this, Weiler argues, is that in large provinces, like
Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia, plant location decisions are
largely driven by other factors such as the availability of raw
materials, transportation costs, access to markets, etc., and that
variation in labor law pales by comparison."a To my knowledge, no
one has argued that regulatory competition has exerted a significant
downward influence on labor law and employment standards in
1
Canada."
The simple lesson to be learned from this brief comparison is that
a regime that creates the structural conditions for regulatory
competition may still have strong labor laws, while a more centralized
one may not. The structural scope for regulatory competition within
federal states is only one factor that determines the trajectory of labor
law. The same lesson has been applied to international and regional
free trade arrangements. Indeed, as noted earlier, there seems to be
an emerging consensus that the structural possibilities for regulatory
competition opened up by NAFTA and similar kinds of trade

858 (1999) (arguing economic integration and regulatory competition has not led to
harmonization, citing the limited spread of right-to-work laws as one example).
29. JUDY FUDGE & ERIC TUCKER, LABOUR BEFORE THE LAW (2001).
30. PAUL WEILER, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES 11 (1980).
31. F.R. SCOTT, ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION ch. 25 (1977), argued that divided

jurisdiction over labor relations was undesirable because it interferes with the ability of unions to
bargain collectively with employers who operated nationally. Scott did not argue that provincial
jurisdiction was promoting a regulatory race to the bottom in labor standards.
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agreements have not produced races to the bottom in the area of
labor law.
C.

Moving the Debate Forward: Toward a Reconstructed Model of
Trade Liberalization'sEffect on Labor Market Regulation

Critics of the RTB model presented in Figure 1 make a strong
case that it oversimplifies the effect of NAFTA-style trade
liberalization on labor law. This part of the article responds to that
criticism in two ways. On the one hand, it argues that their assessment
of NAFTA's impact is based on an artificially narrow focus on private
sector labor legislation. Not only does this leave out public sector
collective bargaining law but it also fails to consider NAFTA's impact
on the effectiveness of the collective bargaining regime. This results in
an understatement of the NAFTA effect. On the other hand, it
accepts that a more nuanced, less structural model is needed that
identifies and locates mediating contextual factors and that allows a
greater role for agency and contingency.
1.

From Private Sector Labor Legislation to the Effectiveness of
Labor Market Regulation

The argument that NAFTA has not promoted a RTB is based on
an examination of private sector labor legislation. While this
methodology is appealing because legislative changes are relatively
easy to track and assess, such an approach misses some of NAFTA's
more important effects. First, it ignores developments in public sector
collective bargaining legislation, presumably on the assumption,
unstated in the literature, that these are unrelated to globalization.
This assumption, however, is problematic.
A number of
commentators have pointed to links between globalization and
government fiscal and tax policies, reductions in government services,
and privatization, all major causes of the harsher public-sector
collective bargaining climate that has led to legislative retrenchment. 2
Belman et al. expressly spell out these links.

32. Joseph B. Rose, Gary N. Chaison & Enrique de la Garza, A Comparative Analysis of
Public Sector Restructuringin the U.S., Canada,Mexico, and the Caribbean,21 J. LAB. STUD. 601
(2000) (increased global competition, trade liberalization, and deregulation exerting tremendous
pressure on public sector); Gene Swimmer, Public-Sector Labour Relations in an Era of Restraint
and Restructuring: An Overview, in PUBLIC-SECTOR LABOUR RELATIONS IN AN ERA OF
RESTRAINT AND RESTRUCTURING 1, 8 (Gene Swimmer ed., 2001) (governments in a globalized
economy fear tax increases and regulation will make them unattractive to capital).
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With greater global competition and reduced tariff barriers it is
easier for capital to flow into countries with low taxes and few
regulations and to export into high-cost countries. Governments
are under increased pressure to compete for business investment
and the associated jobs, and this interjurisdictional competition
may occur in the form of tax reductions and reduced regulations.
The tax reductions directly affect the public sector budget
constraints and employment relations, especially given the
importance of labor cost in the provision of many public services.
Reduced regulation indirectly reduces the demand for government
services, since such regulation was often provided through the
public sector.33

It is also important to emphasize that in both Canada and the
United States, collective bargaining is primarily used to establish
terms and conditions of employment in the public sector. Union
density in the private sector has dropped below twenty percent in
Canada and nine percent in the United States, while public sector
union density is about seventy-five percent in Canada and thirty-seven
percent in the United States.34
Second, by focusing exclusively on legislative change, researchers
fail to consider the impact of trade liberalization on the effectiveness
of labor market regulation. The reasons why we ought to be
concerned with regulatory effectiveness are fairly obvious. Decades
of law and society scholarship have emphasized that there is often a
huge gap between law on the books and the law in action. While law
on the books may have a certain expressive or symbolic value, if it
fails instrumentally to achieve its objectives then there has been
regulatory failure and the putative beneficiaries of the law are
deprived of its promise. In short, we get a very distorted view of
reality if we rely solely on legislative change as a measure of the
impact of trade liberalization on labor regulation.35
Changes in the effectiveness of labor market regulation can come
about in a number of ways other than by direct legislative

33. Dale Belman, Morley Gunderson & Douglas Hyatt, Public Sector Employment
Relations in Transition,in PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN A TIME OF TRANSITION 4-5 (Dale
Belman et al. eds., 1996).
34. Andrew Jackson & Sylvain Schetagne, Solidarity Forever? An Analysis of Changes in
Union Density 14 (Ottawa Canadian Labour Congress Research Paper #24, July 2003), available
at http://canadianlabour.ca/updir/solforeverEn.pdf.
For the United States, see U.S. Census
Bureau, StatisticalAbstract of the United States tbl. 638 (2004-05).
35. David Weil, Implementing Employment Regulation: Insights on the Determinants of
Regulatory Performance,in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 429

(Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997); Stephanie Bernstein et al., Precarious Employment and Law's
Flaw's: Identifying Regulatory Failure and Securing Effective Protection for Workers, in
PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT: UNDERSTANDING

LABOUR MARKET INSECURITY IN CANADA

(Leah Vosko, ed., forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT].
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deregulation. Inaction in the face of a rapidly changing labor market
has been characterized as passive deregulation.3 6 This is particularly
salient in the context of trade liberalization, which has prompted
employers to pursue a variety of flexibilization strategies that have
transformed labor markets." For example, a structural mismatch has
developed between schemes of labor market regulation based on the
standard employment relationship and the growth of precarious
employment.38 Similarly, a central premise of Canadian and U.S.
labor law is that collective bargaining should occur at the enterprise
level. This arrangement has always presented a challenge for unions
outside oligopolistic sectors of the economy, but under trade
liberalization coordination problems have increased and pattern
bargaining has broken down, resulting in greater wage competition
and poorer collective bargaining outcomes.39 Legislative inaction in
these circumstances is properly considered a form of passive
deregulation.
The effectiveness of labor market regulation may also be reduced
by judicial and administrative action, which is much less visible than
legislative change but potentially just as significant. The power of
agencies, tribunals, and courts to interpret legislation can greatly
affect its effectiveness. For example, a narrower interpretation of the
4
term "employee" would significantly reduce labor law's coverage. 0
36. KERRY RrTTcH, VULNERABILITY AT WORK: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE NEW
ECONOMY 24-30 (2004).
37. For a small sampling of the literature on labor market effects, see LORI KLETZER,
IMPORTS, EXPORTS, AND JOBS: WHAT DOES TRADE MEAN FOR EMPLOYMENT AND JOB LOSS?
(2002); ROBERT SCOTr, THE HIGH COST OF 'FREE' TRADE (2003); LESSONS FROM NAFTA:
THE HIGH COST OF FREE TRADE (2003); BRUCE CAMPBELL ET AL., PULLING APART: THE
DETERIORATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME IN NORTH AMERICA UNDER FREE TRADE
(1999); Noel Gaston & Daniel Trefler, The Labour Market Consequences of the Canada-U.S.
Free TradeAgreement, 30 CAN. J. ECON. 18 (1997).
38. On the growth of "non"-standard employment and the resulting labor regulation
difficulties, see Special Issue on Changing Contours of Employment and New Modes of Labour
Regulation, 42 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 593 (2004); PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT, supra note 35;
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS (2004); Judy Fudge & Leah Vosko,
Gender, Segmentation and the StandardEmployment Relationship in Canadian Labour Law, 22
ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 271 (2001).
39. On the issue of decentralized bargaining, see Harry C. Katz, The Decentralization of
Collective Bargaining: A Literature Review and Comparative Analysis, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REv. 3 (1992); Anne Forrest, Bargaining Units and Bargaining Power, 41 RELATIONS
INDUSTRIELLES 840 (1986); Judy Fudge, The Gendered Dimension of Labour Law: Why
Women Need Inclusive Unionism and Broader-based Bargaining, in WOMEN CHALLENGING
UNIONS: FEMINISM, DEMOCRACY, AND MILITANCY 231 (Linda Briskin & Pat McDermott eds.,
1993). On the problem of fragmentation under globalization, see Joseph B. Rose & Gary N.
Chaison, Unionism in Canada and the United States in the 21' Century, 56 RELATIONS
INDUSTRIELLES 34,44-49 (2001).
40. JUDY FUDGE, ERIC TUCKER & LEAH VOSKO, THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT:
MARGINALIZING WORKERS (2002); MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ANGLOAMERICAN LAW: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1989).
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Administrative deregulation can also occur through the enforcement
process. For example, strong occupational health and safety laws can
be rendered ineffective without legislative change by reducing the
enforcement budget or relying exclusively on persuasion to enforce
the law, even after it has failed to alter an employer's behavior.4" The
NAALC's focus on non-enforcement treats this method of hidden
deregulation as illegitimate. Finally, changes in the labor market that
deter employees from exercising or asserting their legal rights also
impair the regime's effectiveness. Fear of retaliation or concern that
an employer will simply close up shop if forced to comply with the law
is a powerful disincentive for employees, whether they are
contemplating joining a union, complaining about illegally low wages,
or calling a health and safety inspector.42
2.

Bringing in Contextual Factors

In modeling the impact of NAFTA on labor regulation, it is
useful to identify two levels of determination: the structural and the
political-economic. This article already argued that NAFTA is
intended to establish a conditioning framework within which capital,
labor, and government operate. Model 1 captures this structural level
of determination, but even after a set of constitutive decisions has
been made there are many mediating factors that will influence
regulatory outcomes. For example, Gunderson hypothesizes that for
trade liberalization to promote downward harmonization four
linkages must exist: 1) the laws in question must be enforced; 2) the
laws must lead to an actual or perceived increase in labor costs to
employers; 3) higher labor costs deter investment and influence plant
location; and, 4) jurisdictions must compete for investment on the
basis of reducing costly labor laws.43 This is a useful beginning, but
this article elaborates a more general model that identifies three sets
of mediating variables involving: economic complexity; internal
adaptation in the collective bargaining scheme; and the external

41.

Bob Hepple, Enforcement: The Law and Politics of Cooperationand Compliance, in

SOCIAL AND LABOUR RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 238 (Bob Hepple ed., 2002); NEIL
GUNNINGHAM & RICHARD JOHNSTONE, REGULATING WORKPLACE SAFETY: SYSTEMS AND

SANCTIONS (1999).
42. See, e.g., RICHARD KAZIS & RICHARD L. GROSSMAN,
BLACKMAIL, LABOR, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992).

43. Gunderson, supra note 7, at 24.
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political, legal, ideological, and social environment that shapes
government policy. '
There are three disputes in the economics literature that
potentially complicate the relationship between trade liberalization
and labor law. The first is a dispute over the magnitude of the
changes in world trade that are associated with globalization and trade
liberalization. For example, Fligstein shows that as a percentage of
world GDP, world trade grew steadily from 1953 until it peaked in
1981, but that over the next sixteen years it fluctuated. He concludes
that from a long-term perspective world trade is not overwhelming
national economies. 5 It is, however, undoubtedly the case that since
the beginning of the free-trade era, there has been a phenomenal
growth in trade between the United States and Canada, which has
more than doubled between 1985 and 2002.'
A second dispute is over the relative significance of labor costs in
investment decisions. It has been argued that even under conditions
of competition, location decisions are driven by a variety of
considerations, and that while local labor costs and the strength of
local labor market regulation are relevant factors, they are not
necessarily the most important ones. Indeed, some studies suggest
that labor standards play a relatively minor role in location decisions
compared to other factors such as the availability of natural resources,
transportation costs, tax considerations, and market size.47 Other
studies, however, show that higher wage costs are associated with
lower employment growth in labor-intensive industries.48
A third dispute is over the optimality of a low-wage, lowstandards economic strategy. It has been argued that lower labor
standards may not be as advantageous as RTB supporters assume.
For example, Kucera's study concludes that lower labor standards do
not improve competitiveness and that, to the contrary, higher labor
44. Fligstein, also criticizes globalization theorists of both the left and right who "want
economic forces to be structural, inevitable, and everywhere dominating action." Instead, he
offers a political-cultural approach that emphasizes the role of social and political forces.
FLIGSTEIN, supra note 23, at 95.
45. Id. at 196-97. See also LINDA WEISS, THE MYTH OF THE POWERLESS STATE 167-76
(1999).
46. John W. Foster & John Dillon, NAFTA in Canada: The Era of a Supra-Constitution, in
LESSONS FROM NAFTA: THE HIGH COST OF FREE TRADE 47 (Hemispheric Social Alliance
2003), available at http://www.art-us.org/docs/high%20cost%20of%20free%20trade.pdf.
47. Elliot, supra note 15; Mario F. Bognanno et al., The Influence of Wages and Industrial
Relations Environments on the Production Location Decisions of U.S. Multinational
Corporations,58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 171 (2005).
48.

JAMES HEINTZ, GLOBAL LABOR STANDARDS: THEIR IMPAcT AND IMPLEMENTATION

(2002). See also Banks, supra note 4 (arguing that competition on the basis of low labor costs
and standards is much more likely in underdeveloped nations).
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standards may be associated with other characteristics that make a
jurisdiction attractive for investors.49 Other studies have reached
similar conclusions and argue that there is no empirical evidence to
demonstrate that the low-wage, weak labor protection model of
economic growth is optimal."
No attempt will be made in this paper to sort out these disputes.
Rather, the point is simply that NAFTA's economic effects are not as
straightforward as the RTB model assumes. Thus, while labor
standards are part of the mix of considerations in the calculus of
location decisions, their salience is likely to depend on a number of
factors that include not only the macro-economic factors identified
above, but also the degree of inter-jurisdictional disparity in standards
and industry- or even employer-specific production regimes. As well,
it is likely that some labor standards are more related to
competitiveness than others. For example, it seems plausible to
assume that strong anti-discrimination laws are less likely to create or
to be seen to create competitive disadvantage than laws that strictly
regulate hours of work. To the extent that NAFTA's economic
effects are more moderate than RTB theorists assert, the degree of
economic compulsion driving a race to the bottom is reduced, leaving
more room for states, firms, and unions to make strategic choices.
This, in turn, marginally lessens the pressure on collective bargaining
regimes and opens up spaces for political, legal, and civil society
influences to operate.
A second point at which mediating factors operate is within the
existing labor and employment law regime, particularly through the
mechanism of internal adaptation.51 Here it is assumed that trade
liberalization and regulatory competition generate pressure on
employers to increase output per unit of labor input, but that this
pressure may be addressed within the existing regulatory framework.
To the extent that adjustment takes place within the existing
framework, labor market deregulation will be a lower priority for
employers.52
49. David Kucera, The Effects of Core Labor Rights on Labor Costs and Direct Foreign
Investment: Evaluation the "Conventional Wisdom" (International Institute for Labour Studies,
See also DRUSILLA K. BROWN,
Decent Work Research Programme, DP/130/2001).
INTERNATIONAL

TRADE

AND

CORE LABOUR

STANDARDS:

A

SURVEY OF

RECENT

LITERATURE (OECD, Labour Market and Social Policy, Occasional Papers, No. 43, 2000).
50. See studies discussed in FLIGSTEIN, supra note 23, at 213-20.
51. Harry J. Glasbeek, Labour Relations Policy and Law as a Mechanism of Adjustment, 25
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 179 (1987).
52. Passive and hidden deregulation have been discussed earlier as ways of reducing the
effectiveness of labor market regulation, but they might also be considered as mechanisms of
internal adaptation. It is preferable, however, to treat them as changes to the regime itself.
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Internal adaptation can occur on at least two levels. At the
macro-level, collective bargaining regimes historically have contained
competing policy goals and visions. For some, a major goal of
collective bargaining laws is to advance a version of industrial
democracy in which employers and organized workers jointly
determine the rules governing their relations. This vision assumes
that industrial democracy is compatible with capitalism because it
yields productivity increases or because competitive pressure will be
alleviated by the spread of industrial democracy across the economy.
For others, collective bargaining was simply an alternative mechanism
for negotiating terms and conditions of employment that employees
might opt into, unconnected to any broader vision of how relations of
production might be made more consistent with democratic norms.
The crucial point here is not which vision is preferable, but that the
same statutory regime could function either as a promoter of
industrial democracy or as an unadorned market mechanism
depending on how it was interpreted and, more importantly, on the
institutional, ideological, and political-economic environment in which
it operated. Internal adaptation at the macro level would involve an
attenuation of the collective bargaining regime's democratic
ambitions.
A second or micro-level of internal adaptation is built into
framework laws, like labor relations acts, that establish a baseline of
rights and a set of procedures through which the parties establish and
negotiate the substantive terms of their relationship. Such a scheme is
inherently adaptive insofar as it gives each party ample leeway to
pursue its objectives, leaving the outcome to be determined through
bargaining. Internal adjustment to trade liberalization could take two
forms. In the optimistic view, competitiveness can be pursued
cooperatively and progressively, so that unions and employers can
negotiate win-win arrangements that create stronger firms more able
to compete in the global market, while providing workers with higher
pay, more involvement, and greater job security. The alternative is
the low road, where management uses its bargaining leverage to
extract concessions and intensify work. In either event, adjustment
occurs, although winners and losers change.53
The third set of mediating factors operates externally to the labor
and employment law regime, potentially constraining the structural

53. For a brief review, see Anil Verma & Richard P. Chaykowski, Employment and
Employment Relations at the Crossroads, in CONTRACT AND COMMITMENT: EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 1, 10-14 (Anil Verma & Richard P. Chaykowski eds., 1999).
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pressures generated by trade liberalization. This can occur through
the political system, the legal system, and civil society, and on
different spatial (e.g., national, international) levels. Beginning with
the political, it has been argued that nation states are a crucial site of
resistance to globalization since social power is still rooted nationally.

Indeed, it is through the exercise of sovereign national power that
liberalized trading regimes are constructed. Thus, while these regimes
may be designed with the aim of disciplining the democratic political

process, it is arguably possible for workers and others who are
adversely affected to mobilize nationally and successfully resist the
neo-liberal project through institutionalized channels, such as
participation in elections and formal lobbying. 4 Indeed, there is a
large literature emphasizing that states have responded to the

pressures of globalization in a variety of ways, reflecting the historical
institutionalization of class and of state-market relations, often

distinguishing between liberal market economies (LMEs) and
coordinated market economies (CMEs) 5 Arguably, then, the race to
the bottom could be thwarted or slowed because of national or subnational political resistance to the erosion of labor standards.

Political action is not just confined to the national sphere and,
indeed, the processes of globalization and trade liberalization have
challenged social movements and labor organizations to develop
transnational political and organizing strategies. Jeffrey Ayres has
recently examined the development of what he calls "contentious
transnationalism" and finds there has been an increase in
institutionalized political activity, such as that facilitated by the
NAALC complaints procedure, and in non-institutionalized activity,

such as cross-border campaigns in the U.S.-Mexico border region. 6

54. Leo Panitch, Globalization, States, and Left Strategies, 23 SOC. JUST. 79 (1996); Jeffrey
Ayres, Power Relations under NAFTA:
Reassessing the Efficacy of Contentious
Transnationalism,74 STUD. IN POL. ECON. 101 (2004).
55. VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE (Peter Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001); GEOFFREY GARRETr, PARTISAN
POLITICS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1998) (social democratic corporatism has successfully
responded to the pressures of globalization and offers a viable alternative); EVELYNE HUBER &
JOHN D. STEPHENS, DEVELOPMENT AND CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE (2001); WEISS, supra
note 45 (globalization is firming up varieties of capitalism).
56. Ayres, supra note 54. See also David M. Trubek et al., Transnationalism in the
Regulation of Labor Relations: InternationalRegimes and TransnationalAdvocacy Networks, 25
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1187 (2005) (elements of a network are emerging but fully effective system
not in place). James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: TransnationalLabour Solidarity
and the Obstacles of Domestic Law, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 379
(Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002) (domestic law limits the scope for transnational labor
solidarity).
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When we turn to legal restraints our focus is in on instruments
that formally limit the power of governments to reduce labor
standards. At the national level, the clearest instance would be
constitutional protections of labor rights, such as freedom of
association or guarantees of equality rights. The strength of this kind
of constraint will obviously vary from state to state and some labor
rights will be better protected than others. At the international or
transnational level, there is a wide range of instruments that
potentially limit state action. The International Labour Organization
(ILO) has historically been the most important body engaged in the
construction of an international labor rights regime through its
declarations, conventions, and, most recently, its adoption in 1998 of
the Declarationon FundamentalPrinciplesand Rights at Work. There

is a large literature assessing the ILO's effectiveness but for our
purposes it is sufficient to note that the ILO's enforcement capacity is
quite limited.57 Nevertheless, the norms generated by the ILO may
influence domestic legal decision-making or may support civil society
opposition. Labor standards are also addressed in the NAALC, but
as noted it only requires states to enforce their laws, not to establish
or maintain a minimum set of labor standards. Nevertheless, the
NAALC supports high labor standards in principle and promotes
them through the Commission for Labor Cooperation. Thus, as in the
case of the ILO, it is arguable that the NAALC influences decisionmaking by domestic courts and tribunals or, more generally, promotes
an ideological climate that exerts a countervailing force to the
pressures for lower labor standards. 8 Again, the question of the
strength of these effects is an empirical one and will be examined in
the context of the case study.59

57. For a small sample of the literature, see Philip Alston, "Core Labour Standards" and the
Transformation of the Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 457 (2004); Sean Cooney,
Testing Times for the ILO: Institutional Reform for the New InternationalPolitical Economy, 20
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 365 (1999); Virginia Leary, The Paradox of Workers' Rights as Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 22 (Lance A. Compa

& Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996); Leah Vosko, "Decent Work": The Shifting Role of the ILO
and the Struggle for Global SocialJustice, 2 GLOBAL SOC. POL'Y 19 (2002).
58. Andrias, supra note 20, at 521 (expressive function of NAALC); Mazuyer, supra note 21
(noting some indirect effects).
59. The inclusion of labor protections in multilateral or bilateral trade agreements would be
another source of international law constraints. The idea has been much debated, but no action
has been taken. See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Policy & Labor
Standards, 2005 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 261 (2005); Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle:
Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61 (2001); Robert
Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BuS. L. 131 (1999); Daniel S. Ehrenberg, From Intention to Action: An ILOGATT/WTO Enforcement Regime for InternationalLabor Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR
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Finally, there may be ideological or civil society restraints on the
erosion of labor standards. The idea here is that if certain norms gain
popular acceptance governments and transnational corporations will
be constrained in their pursuit of competitiveness-enhancing and
profit-maximizing strategies. Thus, for example, Langille argues that
the view that economic growth should be pursued independently of
social justice and human rights is increasingly being challenged by Sen
and others who argue that the promotion of human development
should guide public policy.6" If this view gains popular support,
governments will face greater political opposition to labor market
deregulation, particularly when it adversely affects the most
vulnerable workers.
As well, the spread of a counter-hegemonic ideology may also
promote the growth of strong civil society groups whose activities
constrain the behavior of transnational corporations and
governments. 61
Campaigns by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and workers' rights advocacy groups to pressure
transnational corporations into adopting codes of conduct governing
work conditions of suppliers are the most prominent manifestation of
this influence.62 Another example is the campaign recently initiated
by a consortium of AFL-CIO unions to pressure Walmart into raising
wages and improving conditions, not by organizing its employees, but
by mobilizing public opinion.6 Again, the question of the extent and
direction of an ideological shift, and the effectiveness of civil society
campaigns is an empirical one; here we are only concerned to identify
factors that may counteract pressures to reduce labor standards
arising from regulatory competition in a liberalized trading regime.

RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 163-80 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds.,

1996).
60. Brian A. Langille, Seeking Post-Seattle Clarity-andInspiration,in LABOUR LAW IN AN
ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 137 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002); AMARTYA SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); Joseph Stiglitz, Employment, Social Justice and Societal
Well-Being, 141 INT'L LAB. REV. 9 (2002).
61. KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE

UNDER GLOBALIZATION? ch. 3 (2003) (referring to such activists as human rights vigilantes).
See also Ruben J. Garcia, Transnationalismas a Social Movement Strategy: Institutions, Actors
and InternationalLabor Standards,10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (2003).
62. The literature on corporate codes is voluminous. For a small sample, see ANDREW
ROSS, Low PAY, HIGH PROFILE: THE PUSH FOR FAIR LABOR (2004); Adelle Blackett, Global

Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of
Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401 (2001); Harry Arthurs, Private
Ordering and Workers' Rights in the Global Economy: CorporateCodes of Conduct as a Regime
of Labour Market Regulation, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 471 (Joanne
Conaghan et al. eds., 2001).
63. Steven Greenhouse, Unions to Push for Better Pay at Walmart, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2004, A-16.
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Thus to conclude, a more nuanced model of the effects of
NAFTA-style trade liberalization on labor standards must take into
account a wide range of variables. Figure 2 depicts such a model,
incorporating the variables discussed above.
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Figure 2
Nuanced Model of the Impact of Trade Liberalization on Labor
Standards
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III. CASE STUDY: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW IN CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES

The following case studies of Canada and the United States each
begin with an assessment of the trajectory of its collective bargaining
law, followed by an examination of two of the three mediating factors,
internal adaptation and external constraints. No attempt will be made
to assess the economic impact of trade liberalization on collective
bargaining regimes. Rather, it is assumed that while collective
bargaining laws may not be the most important factor influencing
investment decisions, firms do take them into account because,
according to one recent survey, union members on average receive
higher wages, higher union densities are associated with higher wage
mark-ups, and net company profits tend to be lower in unionized
firms than in non-unionized firms.' The implication of this starting
position is that NAFTA-style trade regimes generate some structural
pressure to reduce the effectiveness of collective bargaining regimes,
but that there is scope for other factors to shape the actual outcome.
A.
1.

Canada

The Trajectory of Collective Bargaining Law
a.
i.

Legislative Change

Private Sector Collective Bargaining

Collective bargaining law in Ontario has been regularly amended
since the enactment of the first Wagner-Act-style collective
bargaining act in 1943. Prior to the free-trade era, legislative reforms
followed a pattern that has been characterized as cautious and
pragmatic.65 Typically, legislation came bundled in packages that
made concessions to both union and employer demands. This
changed in the free-trade era, beginning with the election of the first
New Democratic Party (NDP) government in 1990. Although under
pressure from its union supporters, the NDP government hoped to
achieve a union-management consensus on reform but, after lengthy
consultations failed, it introduced Bill 40 over the vociferous
objections of employers.
The bill was eventually passed after
64. TOKE AIDT & ZAFIRIS TZANNATOS, UNIONS AND
ECONOMIC EFFEcrs IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 4 (2002).

COLLECrIVE BARGAINING:

65. Joseph B. Rose, Ontario: The Conservative Hegemony, in BEYOND THE NATIONAL
DIVIDE: REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 33 (Mark Thompson et al. eds.,

2003).
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extended public hearings.'

The most significant changes included

expedited unfair labor practice hearings, interim reinstatement of
workers fired during an organizing campaign, broader provision for
first contract arbitration, better union access to employees, a partial
ban on replacement workers, extended job protection during strikes,
and a right to picket on some third-party property. Bill 40, however,

was in force briefly. The Progressive Conservative Party (PC) won a
sweeping majority in 1995 and promptly passed Bill 7 without any
consultation or public hearings.

Not only did it repeal the NDP

reforms, but Bill 7 also rolled back earlier reforms, the most important
ending the card-based system of certification.67 This was followed by
another set of amendments in 1998 that, inter alia, stripped the labor

board of its power to order remedial certifications for serious unfair
labor practices.68 Bill 139 was passed two years later, which, inter alia,
promoted union decertification.6 9 More recently, the majority Liberal
government, elected in 2003, passed its own package of labor law
reforms that restored the board's power to order remedial

certification and to reinstate employees terminated during an
organizing campaign on an interim basis. It did not, however, restore
card certification, except in construction.7"

The history of labor law reform in British Columbia has followed
a somewhat different pattern, alternating between employer-driven
reforms and ones emerging from consultative processes. In 1987,
prior to CUFTA, a conservative Social Credit government pushed
through a set of one-sided reforms that ended card-based certification,
facilitated decertification, restricted picketing and boycotts, and

empowered the chair of the labor commission to intervene in trade
disputes. According to the then Labour Minister, Lyall Hanson, the

twin goals of the law were "cost containment and international
competitiveness."71 A majority NDP government was elected in 1991

66. Labour Relations and Employment Statute Law Amendment Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, ch.
21 (Can.).
67. Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Bill 7), S.O. 1995, ch. 1, sch. A; Felice Martinello, Mr.
Harris, Mr. Rae and Union Activity in Ontario, 24 CAN. PUB. POL'Y 17 (2000).
68. Economic Development and Workplace Democracy Act, 1998 (Bill 31), S.O. 1998, ch.
8, known to its critics as the "Walmart Act." This was because the stripping of the power of
remedial certification was a response to its exercise by the board in a decision involving an unfair
labor practice complaint against Walmart for its actions during an organizing drive at its
Windsor store. See United Steelworkers of America v. Walmart, [1997] OLRB Rep. 141. After
extended litigation, the union eventually abandoned the bargaining rights it was awarded.
69. Labour Relation Amendment Act, 2000 (Bill 139), S.O. 2000, ch. 38.
70. An Act to amend certain statutes relating to labour relations (Bill 144), S.O. 2005, ch.
15.
71. Cited in LEO PANITCH & DONALD SWARTZ, FROM CONSENT TO COERCION 104 (3d
ed., 2003).
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and it established a bipartite labor-management consultation
committee that produced a set of consensus recommendations,
including a return to card-based certifications. The parties could not
reach a consensus on three issues and the government crafted a set of
compromises. It banned replacement workers, retained most of the
restrictions on picketing, and declined to implement a broader-based
bargaining scheme for traditionally non-union sectors. In 1998 the
NDP government enacted another set of reforms, the most important
of which established sectoral bargaining for the construction industry.
In 2001 a right-leaning Liberal government was elected and it
promptly repealed the sectoral bargaining provision and restored
mandatory voting for all certifications, although it retained the ban on
replacement workers.7"
Quebec entered the free-trade era with one of the more
progressive private sector collective bargaining laws, having been the
first province to ban replacement workers and make dues deductions
mandatory. It also had a decree law that allowed the minister of labor
to extend the application of a collective agreement to all firms, union
and non-union, that were in the same industrial and geographic sector.
Since the free-trade era, there have been relatively few changes to the
basic collective bargaining law and they have largely aimed to
strengthen it. In 1994 the three-year maximum term was eliminated
(except for first agreements) and in 2001 a more extensive set of
amendments streamlined the administration of the labor code, better
protected individual and union rights in cases of contracting out, and
provided for forced ratification votes. The decree system has not
fared as well. In 1996 the act was amended to require a ministerial
review of all decrees prior to their renewal to determine whether the
decree impairs the competitiveness of the affected industries with
enterprises outside of Quebec. In the years since this change, nearly a
third of all decrees were not renewed, almost all in the manufacturing
sector. By 2000, 73% of manufacturing employers and 60% of
manufacturing employees formerly covered by decrees were
excluded.73

72. Mark Thompson & Brian Bemmels, British Columbia:
Mountains, in BEYOND THE NATIONAL DIVIDE:

The Parties Match the

REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS 97 (Mark Thompson et al. eds., 2003). On earlier legislative reforms, see Harry
Arthurs, The "Dullest Bill": Reflections on the Labour Code of British Columbia, 9 U. B.C. L.
REv. 280 (1974) and PAUL WEILER, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES (1980).
73. Michel Grant, Quebec: A New Social Contract-FromConfrontation to Mutual Gains?,
in BEYOND THE NATIONAL DIVIDE: REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 51

(Mark Thompson et al. eds., 2003); Vallde & Charest, supra note 16; Gauvin, supra note 4.
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Changes in a number of other Canadian jurisdictions reflect the
unevenness observed in the three largest provinces.
NDP
governments in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and the federal Liberal
government have strengthened their private sector collective
bargaining laws in various ways. On the other hand, there has been a
shift away from card-count certifications to mandatory votes. Prior to
the free-trade era only one province required votes. Since 1988 the
number has increased to five (Nova Scotia, Alberta, Newfoundland
and Labrador, Ontario, and British Columbia), covering about twothirds of the labor force.74
Most commentators have concluded that Canadian private sector
labor law has remained relatively stable in the free-trade era.75 While
I do not fundamentally disagree with these judgments, they fail to give
proper weight to the most significant overall change: the declining
availability of card-count certifications. Numerous studies have found
that the shift from card counts to elections significantly reduces union
success rates and lead to a lowering of trade union density.76 As a
result, the negative effect of this change likely outweighs the positive
effect of other changes.
ii.

Public Sector Collective Bargaining

The picture of legislative reforms changes dramatically if we
expand our horizons to include public sector collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining was only extended to the public sector in the
mid-1960s and public sector union density rose rapidly, far exceeding
that of the private sector. From the outset, however, governments
often enacted special legislation overriding the basic public sector
collective bargaining framework to end strikes and impose wage
restraints. As well, essential service designations were expanded to
reduce the number of workers legally permitted to strike. The use of

74. It was up to six until a newly elected NDP government in Manitoba brought back cardcounts following its abolition in 1997 by the PC government then in power. Percentage
calculated from Statistics Canada. Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey (Jan. 7, 2005 release),
availableat http://www.statcan.ca/english/Subjects/Labour/LFS/fs-en.htm.
75. Singh, supra note 4; Verge, supra note 4; Gauvin, supra note 4.
76. These studies are reviewed in John Goddard, Do Labor Laws Matter? The Density
Decline and Convergence Thesis Revisited, 42 INDUS. REL. 459, 476 (2003). In addition, see
Chris Riddell, Union Certification Success under Voting Versus Card-Check Procedures:
Evidence from British Columbia, 1978-1998, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 493 (2004); Sara Slinn,
The Effect of Compulsory Certification Votes on Certification Applications in Ontario: An
EmpiricalAnalysis, 10 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 399 (2003).
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these devices increased in the 1980s, leading one commentator
to
77
characterize the regime as one of "permanent exceptionalism.,
The frequency of legislative interventions has increased in the
free-trade era. Between 1991 and 1996, eleven of the fifteen
governments in power relied on special legislation to extend contracts,
impose wage cuts or freezes, require workers to take unpaid leave
days, or override job security provisions to facilitate downsizing.78
Since 1996, Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia,
Quebec, Saskatchewan, and the Federal government enacted back-towork legislation to end legal strikes by public sector workers, often
imposing contracts rather than sending the dispute to binding interest
arbitration. As well, provincial governments continue to impose
public sector wage restraints and further limit collective bargaining
rights. 79 Based on an overview of the current state of public sector
collective bargaining, one commentator concluded: "Governments
are not prepared to restore a genuine collective bargaining system.""
b.

Passive and Hidden Deregulation?

Trade liberalization has spurred employers to change a range of
employment practices that adversely affect the existing collective
bargaining scheme's effectiveness. 8'
These' include the use of
contingent workers and the outsourcing of work. Contingent workers
are more difficult to organize because they are often less attached to
the workplace and also because their employment status may be
uncertain, even after the extension of the collective bargaining regime
to "dependent contractors. ' '82
Outsourcing and the vertical
77. Leo Panitch, Toward Permanent Exceptionalism: Coercion and Consent in Canadian
Industrial Relations, 13 LABOuR/LE TRAVAIL 133 (1984). The argument has since been
expanded and updated. See PANITCH & SWARTZ, supra note 71. See also Joseph B. Rose,
Public Sector Bargaining: From Retrenchment to Consolidation,59 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES
271 (2004) and DANIEL DRACHE & HARRY GLASBEEK, THE CHANGING WORKPLACE ch. 9
(1992).
78. Swimmer, supra note 32, at 1.
79. Gene Swimmer & Tim Bartkiw, The Future of Public Sector Collective Bargaining in
Canada, 24 J. LAB. RES. 579, 582-85 (2003); COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN CANADA: HUMAN
RIGHT OR ILLUSION? 42-63 (NUPGE & UFCW, 2005).
80. Rose, supra note 77, at 287. See also PANITCH & SWARTZ, supra note 71, at 183-208.
81. Morley Gunderson & Anil Verma, Free Trade and Its Implications for Industrial
Relations and Human Resource Management, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT THE NEW YORK
STATE SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS 167, 170-72 (Maria Lorena Cook &

Harry C. Katz eds., 1994).
82. Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker & Leah Vosko, Changing Boundaries of Employment.
Developing a New Platform for Labour Law, 10 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 361 (2003); CYNTHIA
CRAWFORD ET AL., SELF-EMPLOYED WORKERS ORGANIZE:

(2005).
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disintegration of production also put a large burden on union
organizing resources. Successor rights are available in a rather narrow
range of circumstances so that when a unionized plant contracts work
out, the union must organize the workers who are hired to perform
what was previously bargaining unit work. These are not the only
reasons why private sector union density has declined in Canada
during the free trade era by at lest two percentage points to around
eighteen percent, but they are part of the explanation. 83
Flexibilization also has a significant impact on unions' bargaining
power in the context of a scheme that only requires collective
The
bargaining to occur on a workplace-by-workplace basis.
proliferation of small bargaining units not only increases the costs of
bargaining, but also erodes union bargaining power. The result is
that, outside of a few sectors where pattern bargaining has survived,
unions have been unable to take wages out of competition. As well,
even within unionized workplaces, there has been a significant
increase in contingent employment. For example, the percentage of
new employees in unionized jobs who are hired as temporary
employees has grown from 19 in 1989 to 28 in 2004.' We will look
more closely at the consequences of this development when we
discuss collective bargaining itself as a mechanism of adjustment.
Here it is sufficient to note that the failure to adopt broader-based
bargaining schemes or other measures aimed at redressing the
structural misfit between the current law governing bargaining
structure and changes in the labor market should be considered a
form of passive labor market deregulation.
Turning to judicial and administrative interpretation and
enforcement, to my knowledge there is no evidence that these have
operated as mechanisms of adjustment to trade liberalization in
Canadian collective bargaining law. Canadian labor boards have not
altered their interpretation of their enabling statutes during the freetrade era in a manner that has further limited the law's effectiveness.
Of course, this is not to say that prior to the free-trade era labor
relations boards single-mindedly pursued policies favorable to the
83. The significance of the lack of fit between collective bargaining law and the decline in
trade union density is a matter of some debate. See John O'Grady, Beyond the Wagner Act,
What Then?, in GE1TtNG ON TRACK 153 (Daniel Drache ed., 1992) (pessimistic view of the
viability of the Wagner Act model); Andrew Jackson, Solidarity Forever? Trends in Canadian
Union Density, 74 STUD. IN POL. ECON. 125 (2004) (structural shifts in employment had limited
impact on private sector union density decline).
84. Rend Morisette & Anick Johnson, Are Good Jobs Disappearing in Canada tbl. 12
(Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series, 11FOO19MIE-No. 239),
available at http://www.statcan.ca/cgi-bin/downpub/listpub.cgi?catno=11F0019MIE2005239.
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growth and effectiveness of collective bargaining," but rather that
there has not been a notable departure from the compromises
embedded in board jurisprudence. Indeed, on at least some occasions,
labor boards have attempted to respond to the challenges posed by
employer resistance to collective bargaining and flexibilization

strategies.' In Ontario, the Conservative government threatened the
independence of the labor board by changing long-standing
appointment practices, but it suffered legal setbacks and other
governments have not followed suit.' Moreover, the Supreme Court
of Canada has been giving labor boards greater leeway to interpret
their enabling statutes in the free-trade period than had been the case
previously.'

In short, it would be difficult to claim administrative or

judicial practices changed in a manner that undermined the
effectiveness of the collective bargaining scheme.
2.
a.

Contextual Mediations

InternalAdjustments: Bargaining

The extent to which post-World War II Canadian statutory

collective bargaining schemes were ever an effective vehicle for
constructing a more democratic regime of industrial citizenship is a
matter of considerable debate.89 What is significant, however, is that

there is now widespread agreement that the aspirations of those who
viewed the postwar collective bargaining scheme as a mechanism
through which a new world of industrial citizenship could be created
have been dashed. Even more to the point, globalization has been

85. For a critical assessment, see DRACHE & GLASBEEK, supra note 77, at 57-97.
86. For example, a number of boards have found held that Walmart's tactics for resisting
unionization constitute unfair labor practices. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. WalMart Canada, [1997] O.L.R.B. Rep. 141; Walmart Canada and UFCW, Local 1518, [2003]
B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 156. The Quebec labor board has adopted a more expansive approach to
successor rights. See cases cited in Ivanhoe Inc. v. UFCW, Local 500, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 565.
87. Kevin M. Burkett, The Politicizationof the Ontario Labour Relations Framework in the
1990s, 6 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 161 (1998); Craig Flood, "Hewat v. Ontario," 6 CAN. LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 263 (1998). The impact of these measures in Ontario has not been studied.
88. On the 1980s, see Brian Etherington, Arbitration, Labour Boards and the Courts in the
1980s: Romance Meets Realism, 68 CAN. BAR REV. 405 (1989). The decision in Ivanhoe Inc. v.
UFCW, Local 500, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 566, is more reflective of the court's current, less
interventionist practice.
89. The classic articulation of this aspiration can be found in TASK FORCE ON LABOUR
RELATIONS, CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FINAL REPORT
296 (Woods Task Force,
1968). See also Harry Arthurs, Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challengefor Canada's
Second Century, 45 CAN. BAR REV. 786 (1967). For more negative assessments, LABOUR
GAINS, LABOUR PAINS: 50 YEARS OF PC 1003 (Cy Gonick et al. eds., 1995) and Judy Fudge &
Harry Glasbeek, The Legacy of PC 1003, 3 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L. J. 357 (1995).
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identified as one of the crucial reasons for this failure. 9 Thus, at a
macro-level, it is fair to say that the collective bargaining regime has
internally adapted to the broader environment in which it operates.
Turning to the micro-level of adjustment, a number of indicators
suggest that the predominant approach of employers has been to
adopt forcing strategies to extract concessions at the bargaining table,
rather than "high road" strategies to increase productivity through
improved conditions, more participation, and greater job security.9'
With respect to wages, the union-nonunion wage differential is
estimated to have shrunk from approximately 25% in the late 1970s to
8% in 1997. Major private sector wage settlements have decreased
from an average of 4.8% between 1982 and 1988 to an average of
2.6% between 1989 and 2001. There has also been a breakdown of the
linkage between productivity gains and wage increases. For example,
between 1992 and 2002, productivity in manufacturing increased
nearly 18% while real hourly wages increased by just 3.3%.' As well,
pattern bargaining has been abandoned or disrupted in many
industries. The ability of unions to protect wages and benefits and to
provide their members with employment security has been limited,
despite making these objectives their highest priorities. 93 Moreover,
the average number of strikes per year has declined sharply from 693
between 1982 and 1988 to 409 between 1989 and 2001.' 4
The point is not that collective bargaining imposes no restraint on
unionized employers-unionized employees continue to enjoy a
higher level of protection than non-unionized employees-but rather
that in the free-trade era employers have been able to use the
bargaining process as a mechanism of adjustment to the demands of a
more competitive environment and this has arguably reduced
employer pressure for weaker private sector collective bargaining
laws.

90. H.W. Arthurs, The New Economy and the New Legality: Industrial Citizenship and the
Future of Labour Arbitration, 7 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L. J. 45-63 (1999) and THE NEW ECONOMY
AND THE DEMISE OF INDUSTRIAL CITIZENSHIP (1996).
91. Anil Verma & Richard P. Chaykowski, Employment and Employment Relations, in
CONTRACT AND COMMITMENT: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 12 (Anil
Verma & Richard P. Chaykowski eds., 1999); Gordon Betcherman, Workplace Change in
Canada: The Broad Context, in CONTRACT AND COMMITMENT: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN
THE NEW ECONOMY 21, 27-30 (Anil Verma & Richard P. Chaykowski eds., 1999).
92. Calucated from PANITCH & SWARTZ, supra note 71, at appx. I, tbl. II.
93. Rose and Chaison, supra note 39, at 45-47; ANDREW JACKSON, FROM LEAPS OF FAITH
TO HARD LANDINGS: FIFTEEN YEARS OF "FREE TRADE" 10-11 (2003).
94. Calculated from PANITCH & SWARTZ, supra note 71, appx. I, tbl. III.
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External Constraints
i.

Political

Unions in Canada have a long history of political engagement
that, in the post-World War II era, has principally taken the form of
support for the NDP. Although the NDP has never come close to
winning a federal election, it has formed provincial governments in
British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Saskatchewan before and
during (British Columbia 1992-2001, Manitoba 1999-present, Ontario
1990-95, Saskatchewan 1991-present) the free-trade era. During each
of these periods of NDP government, private sector collective
bargaining laws were modestly strengthened to meet some union
demands. On the other hand, when ideologically conservative
governments have been in power (Ontario 1995-2003, Alberta 1972present, British Columbia 2001-present), private-sector collective
bargaining laws have been weakened in response to employer
demands. Quebec is a special case where a separatist political project
has provided the foundation upon which to build a limited corporatist
entente between labor and management for much of the 1990s. The
election of a right-leaning Liberal government in 2003, however, may
result in private sector industrial relations becoming more
contentious. 95
The political orientation of the government in power has also had
a significant impact on public sector labor relations, with governments
led by centrist and conservative parties being far more aggressive in
their resort to unilateral legislation to constrain public sector unions
and limit collective bargaining than governments led by parties with a
social democratic orientation. However, even left-of-center parties
have supported back-to-work legislation and other "exceptional"
interventions limiting "normal" operation of public sector collective
bargaining laws.'
ii.

Legal

International labor law has not directly constrained the actions of
Canadian governments bent on restricting labor rights, but it has
influenced the development of national legal norms in a manner that
has benefited unions. Canada ratified the first ILO convention

95. PANTITCH & SWARTZ, supra note 71, at 183-208; BEYOND THE NATIONAL DIVIDE,

supra note 65.
96. Swimmer & Bartkiw, supra note 79, at 583; PANITCH & SWARTZ, supra note 71.
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protecting freedom of association (No. 87) in 1972, but not the second
(No. 98). It is generally accepted, though, that all members of the
ILO are obliged to protect the right to freedom of association and
Canada does not dispute this.97 Yet its acceptance of this obligation in
principle has not restrained governmental practice, particularly in
dealing with public sector workers. Panitch and Swartz found that
between 1954 and 2001, 76 complaints have been filed against Canada
for violations of freedom of association, giving it the dubious
distinction of having the most of all G-7 countries. Notably, 35 of
these complaints were filed between 1992 and 2001.98 Since 2001, 16
more complaints have been filed (4 in 2002, 5 in 2003, 6 in 2004, and 1
as of the end of June 2005). The ILO Committee on Freedom of
Association has repeatedly noted with regret that various Canadian
governments are violating workers' freedom of association and
requested that the offending legislation be repealed. These findings
and requests have been ignored."
Turning to the NAALC, it will be recalled that its enforcement
provisions aim to prevent deregulation through non-enforcement of
domestic law. As such, it does not purport to operate as a constraint
on direct labor market deregulation, although it could have an indirect
effect. Perhaps for this reason Canadian unions have continued to
funnel the overwhelming majority of their complaints through the
ILO rather than through the NAALC. Two complaints have been
brought against Canada under the NAALC. The first arose out of the
closure of a McDonald's restaurant in Quebec, allegedly to avoid
unionization. The submitters claimed that McDonald's exploited
loopholes in Quebec's labor law that permits employers to delay
certification proceedings and then close facilities to avoid
unionization. The American NAO accepted the case for review but
shortly thereafter an agreement was reached between the submitters
and the Quebec government to include this issue in an ongoing review
As a result, the complaint was
of the Quebec Labour Code.
withdrawn and the file closed. In 2001 administrative changes were

97. Leary, supra note 57, at 29.
98. PANITCH & SWARTZ, supra note 71, at 54-57, 208-09.
99. For example, see CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87,
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948 Canada (ratification:
1972) (2004), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newcountryframeE.htm, (335th
Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association G.B. 291/7, Geneva, Nov. 2004), IT 412512, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb291/pdf/gb-7.pdf.
For discussion, see Burkett et al., Canada and the ILO, 10 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 231 (2003);
Ken Norman, Promises and Paradoxes: ILO Freedom of Association Principles as Basic
CanadianHuman Rights, 67 SASK. L. REV. 591, 604-08 (2004).
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made to the Code that accelerated the certification process, but
nothing was done to address plant closings to avoid unionization."
The second complaint was about a provision in federal legislation that
deems rural route mail couriers not be employees for the purposes of
collective bargaining law, depriving them of access to a statutory
collective bargaining scheme. The American NAO refused to accept
this complaint because it did not raise a question related to the
enforcement of law. The rural route mail couriers subsequently
achieved voluntary recognition after a lengthy and expensive
organizing drive by the postal workers' union. 1
Although the ILO and NAALC have had little direct effect, the
norms they embrace have influenced the interpretation of domestic
law. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which came into force in
1982, protects freedom of association but does not define its
parameters.
Union supporters hoped the courts would find it
protected the right to bargain collectively and to strike, while
opponents hoped it would be found to limit union security clauses.
Initially both sides were disappointed as the Supreme Court of
Canada's refused to constitutionalize labor rights in order to leave the
state ample scope to craft its labor relations policy as it saw fit. 2 A
recent trilogy of decisions, however, marks a bit of a shift.
In Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General)"°3 the court considered
a Conservative government law excluding agricultural workers from
Ontario's collective bargaining statute. The law not only deprived
agricultural workers of access to a statutory collective bargaining
scheme, but also left them unprotected from employer retaliation for
engaging in organizing activity. In earlier cases, the court had held
that freedom of association is an individual right that prohibits the
state from barring workers from forming associations. It did not
require positive state action to protect workers from adverse action by
non-governmental individuals and organizations." 4 In Dunmore the
court moderated its earlier position in two ways. First, it recognized
that freedom of association protects some collective rights. Second, it

100. Lance Compa, NAFTA's Labour Side Agreement Five Years On: Progress and
Prospects for NAALC, 7 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 22-24 (1999); personal communication with
Stephanie Bernstein, Professor, Department des Sciences juridique, Universit6 du Quebec /
Montreal, Jan. 13. 2005 (on file with author).
101. Compa, supra note 100; CRAWFORD ET AL., supra note 82, at 96.
102. For a discussion of these early cases, see Dianne Pothier, Twenty Years of Labour Law
and the Charter, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 369 (2002); Judy Fudge, Labour, the New Constitution
and Old Style Liberalism, 13 QUEEN'S L.J. 61 (1988).

103. Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016.
104. Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989.
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also found that freedom of association sometimes requires the state to
from private-party
protect particularly vulnerable workers
interference. Specifically, the court held that the government of
Ontario was required to protect agricultural workers against employer
unfair labor practices and to provide their associations with the right
to make representations to employers. This was thin constitutional
protection, since it did not give agricultural workers access to an
effective scheme of collective bargaining, and the then PC
government responded with legislation that gave agricultural workers
the bare minimum required by the court. °5
One particularly interesting feature of Dunmore is that in
reaching its decision the court relied on international law norms to
interpret the Charter's protection of freedom of association. For
example, to defend the proposition that freedom of association was
not just an individual right but also a collective one, Bastarache, J., for
the majority, wrote:
The collective dimension of s. 2(d) is also consistent with
developments in international human rights law, as indicated by
the jurisprudence of the Committee of Experts on the Application
of Conventions and Recommendations and the ILO Committee on
Freedom of Association (see, e.g., International Labour Office,
Freedom of Association: Digest of decisions and principles of the
Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the

ILO (4th ed. 1996)). Not only does this jurisprudence illustrate the
range of activities that may be exercised by a collectivity of
employees, but the International Labour Organization has
repeatedly interpreted the right to organize as a collective right
(see International Labour Office, Voices for Freedom of
Association (Labour Education 1998/3, No. 112): "freedom is not
only a human right; it is also, in the present circumstances, a
collective right, a public right of organisation" (address delivered
by Mr. Lon Jouhaux, workers' delegate). 1°6
Further on Bastarche, J. returned to international human rights
law to justify the court's holding that the Charter may prevent the
exclusion of vulnerable workers from legislation protecting the
exercise of freedom of association.
The notion that underinclusion can infringe freedom of
association is not only implied by Canadian Charterjurisprudence,
but is also consistent with international human rights law. Article 2
of Convention (No. 87) concerning Freedom of Association and

105. An Act to Protect the Rights of Agricultural Workers, S.O. 2002, c. 16. This legislation
is being challenged and the court will be pressed to further constitutionalize collective bargaining
rights.
106. Dunmore, 3 S.C.R. 16.
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Protection of the Right to Organize, 67 U.N.T.S. 17, provides that
"[w]orkers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall

have the right to establish and ...to join organisations of their own
choosing" (emphasis added), and that only members of the armed
forces and the police may be excluded (Article 9). In addition,
Article 10 of Convention No. 87 defines an "organisation" as "any
organisation of workers or of employers for furthering and
defending the interests of workers or of employers" (emphasis
added). Canada ratified Convention No. 87 in 1972. The
Convention's broadly worded provisions confirm precisely what I
have discussed above, which is that discriminatory treatment
implicates not only an excluded group's dignity interest, but also its
basic freedom of association. This is further confirmed by the fact
that Article 2 operates not only on the basis of sex, race,
nationality and other traditional grounds of discrimination, but on
the basis of any distinction, including occupational status (see L.
Swepston, "Human rights law and freedom of association:
Development through ILO supervision" (1998), 137 Int'l Lab. Rev.
169, at pp. 179-180). Nowhere is this clearer than in Article 1 of
Convention (No. 11) concerning the Rights of Association and
Combination of Agricultural Workers, 38 U.N.T.S. 153, which

obliges ratifying member states to secure to "all those engaged in
agriculture" the same rights of association as to industrial workers;
the convention makes no distinction as to the type of agricultural
work performed. Although provincial jurisdiction has prevented
Canada from ratifying Convention No. 11, together these
conventions provide a normative foundation for prohibiting any
form of discrimination in the protection of trade union freedoms
(see J. Hodges-Aeberhard, "The right to organise in Article 2 of
Convention No. 87: What is meant by workers 'without distinction
whatsoever'?" (1989), 128 Int'l Lab. Rev. 177). This foundation is
fortified by Convention (No. 141) concerning Organisations of
Rural Workers and Their Role in Economic and Social
Development (LL.O. Official Bulletin, vol. LVIII, 1975, Series A,

No. 1, p. 28) which extends, under Article 2, the freedom to
organize to "any person engaged in agriculture, handicrafts or a
related occupation in a rural area, whether as a wage
' ' 7earner or....
as a tenant, sharecropper or small owner-occupier. 1
This decision illustrates that, not withstanding its weak
enforceability, "soft" international law may influence the
development of "hard" domestic constitutional law. 1"

107. Id. [27 (emphasis in original).
108. For discussions of Dunmore, see the symposium in 10 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. (2003);
Judy Fudge, "Labour is Not a Commodity": The Supreme Court of Canada and Freedom of
Association, 67 SASK. L. REv. 425 (2004); Jamie B. Cameron, The "Second Labour Trilogy", 16
Sup. CT. L. REv. (CAN.) (2d Series) 67 (2002). On the use of international law in the
interpretation of domestic law, see Stdphane Beaulac, Recent Developments on the Role of
InternationalLaw in Canadian Statutory Interpretation,25 STAT. L. REv. 19 (2004).

2004]

"GREAT EXPECTATIONS" DEFEATED?

The Supreme Court also recently considered the legality of
secondary picketing under common law, a dimension of labor law that
we have not addressed up to now. Historically, courts developed
numerous torts to restrict picketing activity and were particularly
hostile to secondary action. Indeed, in the early 1960s the Ontario
Court of Appeal famously found that secondary picketing was per se
tortious. ° Since 1982 unions have challenged a number of restrictions
on picketing, claiming they violate freedom of expression, but they
enountered two major problems. First, in most Canadian jurisdictions
picketing is governed by common law, not statute, and this raised the
question of whether the Charter applied to private litigation based on
the common law. The court answered this question in the negative,
although it did allow that the common law should be developed in a
manner that was consistent with Charter principles.11° The second
problem was that where the Charter applied because there was state
action, the court upheld restrictions on constitutionally protected
picketing because they were demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society."'
The Supreme Court abruptly reversed its course in a unanimous
judgment in RWDSU, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages
(West) Ltd.,112 in which the court held that secondary picketing is legal

at common law unless it involves conduct that is independently
tortious or criminal. This was the first time that the Court modified
the common law in order to make it conform to Charter values.
Moreover, in reaching its decision, the Court expressed a far more
positive view of the expressive value of picketing than it had in the
past. While this decision still leaves in place all the classic economic
torts (e.g., inducing breach of contract and civil conspiracy to injure)
that provide a basis for limiting secondary activity, it indicates some
willingness to use constitutional norms to expand the scope of legally
permissible collective action.1 3
The third case raised a question about the constitutionality of
union security provisions, particularly whether mandatory union
membership violated freedom of association. The claim hinges on a
finding that freedom of association also protects individuals from
forced association and that various forms of union security bring

109. Hersees of Woodstock Ltd. v. Goldstein, [1963] 2 O.R. 81.
110. RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
111. H.J. Glasbeek, Contempt for Workers, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (1990).
112. RWDSU, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156.
113. For discussion, see Bernie Adell, Secondary Picketing after Pepsi-Cola: What's Clear,
and What Isn't, 10 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 135 (2003).
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people into involuntary association. The court has been badly split on
these issues and this was evident in its most recent decision, R. v.
Advance Cutting & Coring, which produced five separate
judgments."4 A large majority of the court endorsed the proposition
that freedom of association encompasses a negative right from forced
association, but only a bare majority found that a mandatory
membership provision in a Quebec construction industry collective
In the majority's view,
bargaining violated that guarantee.
compulsory membership in a union amounted to a form of ideological
coercion, even in the absence of any evidence that the union imposed
its views on its members. In the result, however, a bare majority of
the justices upheld the law: one judge rejected negative freedom of
association; three rejected the claim that compulsory union
membership violated the negative right; and one held the violation
was demonstrably justified because of the severity of the labor
relations problems in the Quebec construction industry. Thus, while
this particular law survived, the court's decision provides ammunition
for future challenges to union security clauses and the use of union
dues for political activity."5
In sum, law has operated, in a limited way, to constrain
While
downward pressure on collective bargaining schemes.
international law does not impose any enforceable limits on state
action, its norms have influenced the Supreme Court of Canada's
interpretation of domestic constitutional law and led the court to
strike down the PC legislation depriving agricultural workers any
protection or support for associational activities. The court has also
used Charter values to loosen common law restrictions on secondary
action. Law, however, can also be used to limit collective bargaining
schemes, as evidenced by the courts' concern to protect individuals
against compelled associations.
iii. Ideology/Civil Society
An assessment of the extent to which popular beliefs and civil
society activism constrains Canadian governments from deregulating
labor markets generally and weakening collective bargaining regimes
in particular is inherently difficult. In part, the election of social
democratic governments in a number of provinces speaks to the level

114. R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209.
The Supreme Court of Canada and
115. Michael MacNeil, Unions and the Charter:
Democratic Values, 10 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 3 (2003).
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of popular discontent with the social dislocations and growing
inequality that are associated with the combination of trade
liberalization and neo-liberal domestic politics, but our focus here is
on the extra-parliamentary activities of labor and social movements,
particularly as they relate to the collective bargaining regime.
At a national and provincial level, regressive labor legislation has
often been met by large mobilizations of unions and social
movements. In Ontario, for example, the labor movement launched a
series of one-day municipal-wide general strikes in response to the PC
government's labor law reforms. Social movements joined the cause,
bringing in their concerns about other government policies, producing
unprecedented displays of solidarity. In Toronto, nearly a million
people took to the streets. Yet the movement fizzled, in part because
of internal tensions between public and private sector unions. 16 In
subsequent years two massive public sector strikes, one a legal strike
by provincial government employees, the other an illegal provincewide strike by Ontario teachers opposed to legislation that, inter alia,
weakened their collective bargaining rights, also attracted widespread
public support, but did little to deter the government from pursuing its
agenda, although it may have moderated the use of legal coercion
against the strikers. 17
Trade liberalization and the growing economic integration of
Canada, the United States, and Mexico has encouraged the
development of transnational union and social movement activism.
For example, it has been suggested that the greatest contribution of
the NAALC complaint process is not the case results, but the
deepening of ties between national labor movements.118 Yet despite
the growth of this activism, it would be difficult to argue that it has
constrained the Canadian state, in part because activists have not
targeted Canada. Rather, transnational activism has aimed at labor
market regulation and enforcement in Mexico and other less
developed countries, the overseas labor practices of multinational
corporations and their contractors, and developments in the laws and
institutions governing international trade. To the extent that crossborder resistance is successful, it relieves some of the pressures that

116. Marcella Munro, Comment on Ontario's Days of Action and Strategic Choices for the
Left in Canada,53 STUD. POL. ECON. 125 (1997).
117. DAVID RAPAPORT, No JUSTICE, No PEACE: THE 1996 OPSEU STRIKE AGAINST THE
HARRIS GOVERNMENT (1999); Harry Glasbeek, Class Wars: Ontario Teachers and the Courts,
37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 813 (1999).
118. Ayres, supra note 54, at 110.
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may otherwise promote Canadian labor market deregulation, but its
effects are quite indirect.
3.

Conclusion

The emerging consensus that the trajectory of Canadian labor law
has not changed for the worse during the free-trade era fails to give
adequate weight to the negative effects of the move from card-count
certifications to elections that has occurred in many private-sector
collective bargaining statutes. It is arguable that the negative effect of
this change on trade union density outweighs the positive effects of
more union friendly amendments. The trajectory looks even worse if
we include public sector collective bargaining legislation, as Canadian
governments have increasingly limited the collective bargaining rights
of public and para-public sector employees. Finally, an even more
negative assessment is reached if we focus on regulatory effectiveness.
Trade liberalization has contributed to the rapid restructuring of the
Canadian labor market over the past fifteen years, but collective
bargaining law has not been adapted to this new reality. The result is
a growing mismatch between the legal regime and the world in which
it operates.
Yet, it is also the case that the downward trajectory of the
collective bargaining regime has not been as steep as many free-trade
critics predicted. This is because of internal accommodations and
external restraints.
Internal accommodation is built into free
collective bargaining, which is designed to be responsive to changes in
bargaining power. The role of collective bargaining as promoter of
industrial democracy has diminished, leaving it as just one mechanism
among others for establishing terms and conditions of employment.
At the same time, union bargaining power has declined, so that
unionized employers have been able to implement flexibilization and
cost-cutting strategies, albeit not without resistance. For those who
view collective bargaining as a mechanism for protecting labor
standards this is not good news, but it does help explain why the
pressure for legal deregulation may have been blunted. Indeed, it is
arguable that because market discipline does not operate as
effectively on the public sector governments have been more inclined
to use legislation to achieve their objectives. External influences,
however, have exerted some moderating pressure. In particular, there
is considerable political support for parties that articulate an
alternative to the neo-liberal vision of a world governed by market
forces. Where left-center parties are elected, the private sector
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collective bargaining regime has been sustained and there is somewhat
less frequent resort to coercive legislation in the public sector.
International and domestic constitutional law have exerted a weak,
but moderating, effect most clearly exhibited in the Dunmore decision
imposing a positive obligation on the state to protect the exercise of
freedom of association for vulnerable workers. Finally, while there
have been major civil society mobilizations to oppose trade
liberalization and sporadic mass demonstrations against anti-union
labor legislation, their restraining effect has been limited.
B.

1.

United States

Trajectory of Labor Market Regulation
a.

i.

Legislative Change

Private Sector Collective Bargaining

The most notable characteristic of American private collective
bargaining legislation is that it has not changed in any major respect
since at least 1959 and that its basic text dates from 1935 and 1947.
Legislative inaction is not the result of a lack of effort, largely on the
part of unions, to amend the law. Rather, it is primarily caused by
organized employers mobilizing enough support in Congress to block
any amendment proposed by labor." 9 Clearly, employer opposition to
union-sponsored labor law reform predates NAFTA, so it cannot be
said that legislative inertia is one of NAFTA's effects, although it is
fair to surmise that in the post-NAFTA environment employers'
resolve to resist labor law reforms, such as a prohibition on the
permanent replacement of striking workers, has only been
strengthened.120 Therefore, an assessment of NAFTA's impact on
private sector collective bargaining must shift to passive and
judicial/administrative forms of deregulation.
ii.

Public Sector Collective Bargaining

Jurisdictional arrangements over public sector bargaining in the
United States are extremely decentralized. As a result, collective
bargaining rights are "a crazy-quilt patchwork of state and local laws,

119. Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527,
1530 (2002).
120. Two bills containing this prohibition gained majority support in Congress in 1992 and
1994, but in each case were filibustered in the Senate. Id. at 1541.
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regulations, executive orders, court decisions, and attorney general
opinions.' ' 121 Like in Canada, public sector collective bargaining laws
were first passed in the 1960s and were adapted from the private
sector model, subject to a variety of limitations regarding the scope of
bargaining and methods of dispute resolution. Unionization in the
public sector spread rapidly, even as private sector density fell.
Because of its decentralized character, public sector labor law is
much more responsive to changes in the political orientation of the
government in power than private sector legislation. As a result,
changes in public sector labor law have been diverse, making it
difficult to identify an overall trend. Belman et al., argue that public
sector collective bargaining has moved from a period of maturation to
one of transition, and that its future direction will be shaped by two
competing strategies, one involving a best practices approach, the
other cost-cutting and downsizing. 122 In the former scenario, public
sector collective bargaining may fare well, while in the later it is likely
to be restrained.
Federal government labor law provides a good example of how
shifting political fortunes influence the direction of change. The
Clinton administration issued Executive Order 12871 in 1993. It
aimed to improve government efficiency through partnership
arrangements with its unionized employees. Under this regime, union
membership and density increased in the federal public service. The
Bush administration was opposed to working with unions and
repealed EO 12871. As well, his administration sought and gained the
power to exclude unions from agencies handling public security issues.
As a result, federal sector union density has been declining. 2 3
At the state level, the picture is quite mixed. As of 2002 there
were twenty-seven states that did not have public sector collective
bargaining laws, although provision existed in some of those states for
collective bargaining under local ordinances or executive orders. This
is largely unchanged from the situation in 1987.24
Collective
bargaining rights were extended to public sector workers in a number
121. John Lund & Cheryl Maranto, Public Sector Labor Law: An Update, in PUBLIC
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN A TIME OF TRANSITION 21, 21 (Dale Belman et al. eds., 1996). See
also James T. Bennett & Marick F. Masters, The Future of Public Sector Labor-Management
Relations, 24 J. LAB. RES. 533, 533-35 (2003).
122. Belman, Gunderson & Hyatt, supra note 33, at 2.
123. Robert Tobias, The Future of Federal Government Labor Relations and the Mutual
Interests of Congress, the Administration, and Unions, 25 J. LAB. RES. 19 (2004).
124. Joyce M. Najita & James L. Stern, Introduction and Overview, in COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE EXPERIENCE OF EIGHT STATES 3, 5 (Joyce M.
Najita & James L. Stern eds., 2001); Steven Kreisberg, The Future of Public Sector Unionism in
the United States, 25 J. LAB. RES. 223, 226-27 (2004).
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of states by executive order (e.g., Maryland and Kentucky), but in at
least one state, Indiana, the public sector collective bargaining scheme
was terminated by executive order."z Belman et al. conclude that "the
pronounced trend since 1987 has been toward circumscription 12of6
bargaining and toward support for unilateral action by government
but it would appear that post-NAFTA retrenchment in the United
States is not as severe as it has been in Canada.
b.

Passive and Administrative/JudicialDeregulation

The real story of private sector American labor law is not that it
has been stripped down by legislative change (at least not since 1959),
but rather that it has become ineffective in promoting collective
bargaining or even in protecting basic worker rights to freedom of
association. The process of erosion, however, was already well
advanced long before NAFTA. Private sector union density hovered
around the 30% range until about 1970, when it began dropping
sharply. By the beginning of the free-trade era it had dropped to
around 13% and has since fallen below 9%.127
There is a great debate over the causes of this decline and
whether and to what extent it is attributable to the deficiencies of
collective bargaining law itself, its interpretation, and its
administration, particularly in the face of growing employer resistance
to unionization. It is beyond the scope of this article to review that
literature, but there seems to be fairly compelling evidence that law
does matter and that its failings explain some significant part of the
decline of private sector unions.1" In particular, the U.S. system of
drawn-out certification elections and the lack of adequate protection
against unfair labor practices have been noted as major impediments
to successful organizing drives in the face of employer hostility, while
the grant of legal authority to employers to hire permanent strike
replacements and the restriction on unions engaging in secondary
action have been identified as major causes of weakened union
bargaining power.2 9 These shortcomings are, in part, embedded in

125. Kreisberg, supra note 124, at 223-25; Kevin Corcoran & Mary Beth Schneider,
Governorsays no to bargaining,Jan. 11, 2005, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (ONLINE).
126. Belman, Gunderson & Hyatt, supra note 33, at 10.
127. Goddard, supra note 76, at 465; U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 34, at tbl. 638.
128. For a useful overview, see Bruce Nissen, The Recent Past and Near Future of Private
Sector Unionism in the U.S.: An Appraisal,24 J. LAB. RES. 323, 323-28 (2003).
129. Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983); Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of
Contract and the Prospectsfor Union Representation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 351, 412-19 (1984); Risa

COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:97

the statute's text, but are also the product of decades of administrative

and judicial decision-making. 3 ° The NLRB has become far more
politicized than Canadian labor relations boards and thus there are

much greater shifts in decision-making when a new administration
takes office. For example, the current Bush board has been accused
of exhibiting a strong employer bias in recent decisions that have, inter
alia, overruled Clinton board decisions that facilitated bargaining by

graduate teaching assistants and contingent workers. 3' On the
judicial front, the United States Supreme Court has for many years
given priority to individual rights over the promotion and preservation
of collective bargaining relationships.'32 For all these reasons, the
general picture is one of a regime that has become sclerotic through a
combination of statutory
gridlock, the weight of past decisions, and
133
judicial constraints.
If American labor law was already ineffective at the beginning of

the free-trade era, changes in the labor market since then have only
exacerbated the problem.

Much of the success of the U.S. labor

movement was premised on its ability to take wages out of
competition. As free trade agreements unleash competitive forces,
and governments deregulate sectors of the economy, like interstate

3
trucking and airlines, unions can no longer sustain that position. 1
Stone notes, "As firms find themselves in a more competitive
environment through increased trade and global competition, they
have to pay more attention to short-term cost reduction."' 35 For nonunion firms, union avoidance looms as an even higher priority than it

did previously. According to a study of union certification campaigns
Lieberwitz, Labor Law in the United States: The ContinuingNeed for Reform, 46 MANAGERIAL
L. 53 (2004); FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 27, at 63-77.
130. JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS
POLICY, 1947-1994 (1995); Estlund, supra note 119, at 1558-69.
131. Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB,
1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2000); GROSS, supra note 130; Steven Greenhouse, Labor
Board DetractorsSee Bias Against Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2005, at 12.
132. James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103
MICH. L. REV. 518 (2004); James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining
Protections and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939 (1996); Ellen J. Dannin &
Terry H. Wagar, Lawless Law? The Subversion of the National Labor Relations Act, 34 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 197 (2000) (focusing on the deleterious effect of the court-developed doctrine that
allows employers to implement final offers on reaching an impasse on collective bargaining
relations).
133. Estlund, supra note 119, 1558-69.
134. Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3,12-15 (1993).
135. STONE, supra note 38, at 86. See also Joel Cutcher-Gershfeld & Thomas Kochan,
Taking Stock: Collective Bargainingat the Turn of the Century, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3,
20 (2004) (international competition and pressure for flexibility are important drivers of systemic
work practice changes); Rose & Chaison, supra note 39, at 47-49.
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in 1998 and 1999, more than half the targeted employers threatened to
move or shut-down operations in response to union activity.'3 6
Growing competitive pressure has also promoted reliance on
flexibilization strategies, including outsourcing and the growth of
contingent and precarious employment,'37 all of which undermine the
effectiveness of collective bargaining law that was constructed on the
norm of the standard employment relation that offered workers longterm, reasonably secure employment with a large employer. The new
labor market places enormous demands on unions to continuously
organize new and small bargaining units, often populated by
contingent workers whose employment status may be uncertain, and
to negotiate collective agreements with small firms operating in highly
competitive environments.'38 Thus, although a number of scholars
argue that trade liberalization is not a major direct cause of
deunionization, many agree that its indirect effects are significant."'
In short, it is hardly a cause for celebration to say that the rights
of U.S. workers under its private sector collective bargaining laws
have not been eroded by legislative change during the free-trade era.
The effectiveness of U.S. labor law was already close to the proverbial
bottom prior to the free-trade era, so it is not surprising that
employers have not pursued labor law reform as a means of
adjustment to the pressures of globalization. Rather, their lobbying
energies have been directed at blocking union-sponsored labor law
reforms to remedy the scheme's well-documented deficiencies in
today's labor market. The growing mismatch between the legal
regime and the world of work that it is intended to regulate justifies
characterizing what has happened as a case of passive and
administrative deregulation par excellence.
2.

Contextual Mediations
a.

Bargaining

While it has been argued that the Wagner Act was conceived as
an ambitious attempt to construct a more democratic and cooperative
136. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 17.
137. PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA 33-44 (2001); LAWRENCE MISHEL ET
AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2002/2003, 250-62 (2003) (serious employment
declined from 1995-2000 but is increasing in current labor market recession).
138. STONE, supra note 38, at 67-86, 196-216.
139. ROBERT E. BALDWIN, THE DECLINE OF US LABOR UNIONS AND THE ROLE OF TRADE
(Institute for International Economics, June 2003) (small portion of union decline due to tradeinduced sector shifts); Nissen, supra note 128, at 326 (globalization negatively affects social
regulation).
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workplace, there is little dispute that, at best, American collective
bargaining has become a vehicle through which unions and employers
negotiate work rules, wages, and benefits. This occurred well before
the free trade era, so our focus here will be on collective bargaining
outcomes. 14
As in Canada, a number of indicators suggest that unionized
employers are extracting concessions through the collective
bargaining process. On the economic front, the wage differential
between unionized and non-unionized employees has narrowed: from
1991 to 2000 the wages of non-union workers increased faster than
those of unionized workers. 4 ' As well, the linkage between
productivity gains and union wage increases has been broken as
capital is extracting a larger share of productivity growth.'42
Employers have also successfully pursued flexibilization strategies.
According to one survey, in 1999 new work flexibility arrangements
were achieved in one-third to one-half of negotiations, while new job
security provisions were made in one-tenth to one-quarter of
collective agreements. Even more troubling was that less than ten
percent of respondents reported that they had somewhat or very
cooperative relations and that their relationship was improving.'43
The picture that emerges from this study is that, while innovative
contract language is being negotiated, it results from management
forcing its agenda onto the union without providing workers with the
job security or wage increases they seek. The capacity of unions to
resist these concessions is diminished, as evidenced in the decreasing
frequency of work stoppages: in 1989 there were 51 strikes idling 1,000
or more workers, but only 15 strikes idling 1,000 or more workers in
2004.1'

The result is adjustment, but of an imbalanced, not a

progressive, kind; more the product of changing power relations than
the negotiation of mutual gains along the high road.

140. Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1379 (1993) (arguing Senator Wagner sought to
construct a cooperative social democracy); Katherine Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in
American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981) (arguing that Act created a bare legal
framework to facilitate private ordering by management and labor); Karl E. Klare, Judicial
Deradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,62 MINN. L.
REv. 265 (1978) (Act's transformative potential defeated).
141. Ann C. Foster, Differences in Union and Nonunion Earnings in Blue-collar and Service
Occupations (U.S. Dep't. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, June 25, 2003), available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20030623ar01pl.htm.
142. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 137, at 86-94, 156-58.
143. Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Kochan, supra note 135, at 9-10, 22.
144. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Series WSU 100.
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b.

External Constraints

i.

Political Constraints

Given the ineffectiveness of the current private sector collective
bargaining scheme, the political problem in the United States has not
been to block legislative deregulation, but to enact reforms to reverse
its downward trajectory. This has been beyond the means of the
American labor movement. Because labor law is federal, political
influence in particular states is not sufficient to produce legislative
change. As well, in the absence of a social-democratic party, the U.S.
labor movement has traditionally channeled its political energies into
support for the Democratic Party. Yet even during Democratic
administrations, the labor movement has been unable to get any part
of its collective bargaining reform agenda passed in the face of
vigorous employer opposition, and there is little prospect in the
foreseeable future that this will change.145
ii.

Legal

International law has had even less influence in the United States
than in Canada. Although the United States has not ratified either of
the ILO's core conventions respecting freedom of association
(Conventions 87 and 98), it supported the ILO Declaration of
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which includes freedom

of association. As well, member countries are bound to respect the
principles of Conventions 87 and 98 even if they have not ratified
them and the United States has accepted the jurisdiction of the ILO
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) to review complaints
filed against it.
Like Canada, while the United States accepts these international
rights in principle, it feels free to depart from them in practice. In
1990 the CFA upheld two complaints against the United States, one
challenging the right of employers to hire permanent replacements for
striking workers and the other challenging state laws prohibiting
public sector unionization and collective bargaining. The government
took no action to bring its laws into compliance with ILO standards. "
This seemed to discourage further complaints, although recently there
145. Estlund, supra note 119, at 1540-45.
146. Lance Compa, Workers Freedom of Association in the United States: The Gap between
Ideals and Practice, in WORKERS' RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 23, 28-30 (James A. Gross ed.,
2003); Burkett et al., supra note 99, at 260-64. For a more positive assessment, see Anthony G.
Freeman, ILO Labor Standards and U.S. Compliance, 3 PERSPECTIVES ON WORK 28 (1999).
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has been renewed interest in the process. Since 1999 four complaints
have been filed, two of which were subsequently withdrawn and one
which is still pending. The other complaint concerned the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Hoffman Plastics, which held that
undocumented workers who are illegally dismissed for union
organizing activities are not entitled to back pay for lost wages. The
CFA ruled that the decision violates international law protecting
workers' freedom of association and invited the U.S. government to
explore all possible solutions, including amending the legislation, in
full consultation with the social partners concerned. The U.S.
government, however, has not taken up the CFA's invitation and in a
recent follow up the CFA regretted that the government has not
provided any information on measures taken to explore possible
solutions, thus continuing its pattern of neglecting ILO norms.'47
The NAALC has also had little impact on American labor law.
To date, 9 complaints have been filed against the United States, 7 with
the Mexican NAO, and 2 with the Canadian. Seven of these related
to freedom of association. The first was launched in 1995 and
involved the closure of a Sprint plant, allegedly to avoid unionization.
Ministerial consultations produced an agreement to keep the Mexican
Secretary of Labor informed of the legal proceedings underway in the
United States, to instruct the NAALC secretariat to study the effects
of sudden plant closures on freedom of association, and to hold a
public forum in San Francisco, the site of the closure. In December
1996, the NLRB ruled that the plant closing was motivated by antiunion animus, but the United States Court of Appeal overturned
decision in November 1997. The NAALC secretariat's report, issued
in April 1997, found that threats of plant closing to resist union
organizing efforts were widespread in the United States but less
prevalent in Canada and Mexico."

147. Commission on Freedom of Association, ILO, Cases 2026, 2227, 2292 and 2309;
Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 535 U.S. 137 (2002);
Commission on Freedom of Association, ILO, CFA Report No. 332 (Vol. LXXXVI, Nov. 2003,
Series B, No. 3) and Report No. 335 (Vol. LXXXVII, 2004, Series B, No. 3). For a recent report
on the negative impact of the Hoffman ruling, see Human Rights Watch, Blood, Sweat, and Fear:
Workers' Rights in U.S. Meat and Poultry Plants,available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/
usa0105.
148. Mexico NAO Submission 9501 (Sprint); Mazuyer, supra note 21, at 251; Secretariat of
the Commission for Labor Cooperation, Plant Closings and Labor Rights (1997), available at
http://www.naalc.org/English/study7.shtml; Lance Compa, NAFTA's Labour Side Agreement
Five Years On: Progess and Prospectsfor the NAALC, 7 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 17-19 (1999);
Human Rights Watch, Trading Away Rights: The Unfulfilled Promise of NAFTA's Labor Side
Agreement 40 (New York: Vol. 13, No. 2 (B), Apr. 2001).
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Three complaints were filed in 1998 that raised freedom of
association issues. 149 All three were resolved by the signing of a
ministerial agreement that included an undertaking to hold a
government-to-government meeting to discuss the application of U.S.
law in the areas raised by the submission. As well, public outreach
and education sessions were organized in two of the localities where
the alleged violations occurred to inform the public of the workers'
legal rights. In 1999 the Canadian NAO declined to accept a
submission made by the Labor Policy Association, an advocacy
organization representing major U.S. corporations, alleging that the
NLRB's interpretation of the law prohibiting employer interference
with trade unions interfered with employee involvement programs,
thereby violating workers' freedom of association. Finally, in 2003,
the Mexican NAO accepted a submission regarding the nonimmigrant visa work program and has requested cooperative
consultations with the U.S. NAO. 15 0
The results of the complaints process have been disappointing, to
say the least. As one commentator noted, "up to now all cases have
ended with ministerial consultations and the joint agreement of action
programmes that have not produced visible changes in the legal
practices of the countries concerned."''
In part this is a function of
the NAALC's design, since complaints about freedom of association,
collective bargaining, and the right to strike cannot go past the first
stage of ministerial consultations. The result is that disputes are
resolved at the political level in a context in which no government has
an interest in pursuing high intensity conflict strategies." 2 Not
surprisingly, activists are losing interest in using the NAALC and few
new submissions are being filed.
This still leaves open the possibility that international labor and
human rights norms exert an indirect influence through domestic
constitutional and common law, as we saw in Canada. This has not
been the case in the United States. The U.S. constitution does not
protect freedom of association as such, and so attempts to
constitutionalize labor rights have had to rely on other protected
rights. None of these have been successful. Indeed, opponents of
149. Mexico NAO Submission 9801 (SOLEC); Mexico NAO Submission 9802 (Washington
Apple Growers); Mexico NAO Submission 9803 (DeCoster Egg).
150. Canada NAO Submission 99-1 (LPA); Mexico NAO Submission 2003-1 (North
Carolina). The background to the latter submission is discussed in Compa, supra note 146, at
47-48.
151. Dombois, Hornberger & Winter, supra note 20, at 430. For similar conclusions, see also
Human Rights Watch, supra note 148; Andrias, supra note 20; Summers, supra note 21.
152. Dombois, Hornberger & Winter, supra note 20, at 430-35.
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collective labor rights have had more success invoking constitutional
protection for the right of individuals to refrain from compelled
association.153 As well, international labor and human rights norms
have not influenced the courts' constitutional interpretations in this
area, although a majority of the Supreme Court has considered
international law norms in its assessment of cruel and unusual
punishment.154 Still, there is little likelihood that in the near future the
U.S. Supreme Court will exercise its powers of constitutional or
statutory interpretation, or develop the common law, in ways that will
better protect workers' freedom of association.
iii.

Civil Society Constraints

As noted, it is inherently difficult to assess the extent to which
popular beliefs and social movement activism constrain government
action. The U.S. labor movement, in coalition with other social
movements, has scored some successes in opposing the free-trade
agenda. It was largely responsible for creating a political environment
in which then-candidate Clinton felt constrained to make his support
for NAFTA conditional on the negotiation of a side accord protecting
labor and the environment. As well, in the fall of 1997 and in 1998,
the labor movement successfully lobbied to block the grant of fasttrack trade negotiation authority to Clinton.'55 The labor movement
also played a key role in organizing the protests at the WTO meetings
in Seattle. Its influence, however, has weakened. In 2000 the House
approved a trade deal with China and in 2002 legislation was passed
that included trade promotion authority allowing the president to
negotiate trade agreements that Congress must vote up or down
without amendment.
Labor and environmental issues can be
addressed in those trade agreements, but in the most recent
agreements this has taken the form of NAALC-type provisions that
express a commitment in principle to core labor standards, but only
require each party to enforce its existing laws while excusing
weaknesses due to reasonable exercises of discretionary power and
bona fide decisions regarding the allocation of resources.'56

153. Estlund, supra note 119, at 1579-87.
154. Most recently, see Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (U.S. Mo. 2005). See also
Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: ConstitutionalPossibilitiesfor Incorporationof Human
Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 257-58 (2001).
155. James Shoch, Organized Labor versus Globalization,in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT:
LABOR'S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 275 (Lowell Turner et al.

eds., 2001); Ayres, supra note 54, at 107-08.
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While these efforts aim to protect American labor from "unfair"
competition, they do not address directly the declining efficacy of the
U.S. labor law regime. In large part, this is because the labor
movement recognizes that domestic labor law reform is not achievable
under current conditions. The American labor movement has
recently split apart over the issue of how to reverse its declining
fortunes, with one group emphasizing political lobbying and the other
social movement unionism.'57 Social movement unionism, which
emphasizes grassroots organizing and coalition building, has scored
some notable successes, but it is not clear that either strategy will
enable the labor movement to overcome the pressures undermining
the efficacy of American labor law.' 58 Transnational labor and social
movement activism has increased, in part stimulated by the NAALC
complaints mechanism. The U.S.-Mexican border has been the site of
much of this activity. 59 Its primary focus, however, has been on
Mexican labor practices. As well, transnational activism outside the
NAFTA framework has also focused on labor practices in the
undeveloped world. As a result, transnational civil society activism
exerts little or no pressure on the U.S. government to address the
erosion of its collective bargaining regime.
3.

Conclusion

An assessment of the trajectory of U.S. collective bargaining law
must start from the fact of its weakened state at the beginning of the
free-trade era. Because it started closer to the bottom, it was less
affected by competition than Canada, the jurisdiction with marginally
higher labor standards. U.S. employers have not needed to make
significant efforts to amend the NLRA in the free-trade era. This
legislative stasis, however, does not establish that the collective
bargaining regime's efficacy is unaffected by globalization. While
U.S. collective bargaining law has not been racing downward,
increased global competitiveness has changed the labor market in
ways that are antithetical to its ability to promote collective
bargaining and protect workers' freedom of association. The growing
mismatch between law and the social reality in which it operates

157. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Debates the Future of a FracturedMovement, N.Y. TIMES,
July 27, 2005, at A13.
158. FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 27; HOYT N. WHEELER, THE FUTURE OF THE
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Public sector collective
produces greater regulatory failure.
bargaining has also been adversely affected by the adoption of neoliberal policies that are associated with the competitiveness agenda,
but retrenchment does not seem to be as severe in the United States
as it has been in Canada. The impact of liberalized trade on collective
bargaining law, however, is mediated by internal and external factors.
Internally, the collective bargaining process has accommodated
employer-initiated demands for concessions and greater flexibility.
Externally, political constraints have operated to prevent enactment
of the remedial legislation required to slow or reverse its erosion
through what can best be characterized as malign neglect. As well,
international law has little or no influence on the direction of U.S.
labor law, and there seems little prospect that courts will
constitutionalize labor rights or otherwise protect them through their
power to interpret statutes and develop the common law. Finally, civil
society activism in the labor rights area is largely directed outward,
rather than inward on domestic labor policy.
IV.

CONCLUSION: HAVE GREAT EXPECTATIONS BEEN DEFEATED?

If the great expectation was that NAFITA would produce
dramatic and significant legislative erosion of collective bargaining
laws, then it is fair to say that expectation has been partially defeated.
In the United States, the NLRA has not been amended during the
free-trade era, and, to the extent that it is possible to discern a trend,
public sector collective bargaining law has suffered relatively modest
setbacks. The expectation of erosion was stronger for Canada, the
jurisdiction with the higher labor standards, and while there has not
been a race to the bottom in labor legislation, there has been
deterioration. While private sector collective bargaining laws have
been strengthened and weakened at different times and in different
places, the most significant change has been the elimination of cardcheck certifications in many jurisdictions, including Ontario and
British Columbia. As numerous studies have shown, this change is
likely to have a significant and negative impact on trade union density.
Moreover, if we expand our focus to include public sector collective
bargaining, we find the level of legislative erosion even greater as the
frequency with which Canadian governments override or reduce
existing collective bargaining rights has increased in the past decade.
The extent of defeated expectations is even less if we shift our
focus from legislation to regulatory effectiveness. U.S. collective
bargaining law was notoriously ineffective going into the free-trade
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era and has only become more so as trade-linked changes to the labor
market have created an environment that is even more inimical to the
creation and perpetuation of collective bargaining relationships. A
similar situation prevails in Canada, although it is moderated
somewhat by stronger and better-enforced labor rights.
The partial vindication of the predictions of Model 1 still leaves
us with the need to explain why great expectations were partially
defeated. The contextual variables introduced by Model 2 led to an
examination of factors internal to the system of collective bargaining
and ones external to it. Collective bargaining is itself a mechanism of
adjustment that accommodates the parties' changing goals and
objectives. In both Canada and the United States there is evidence
that the regime is accommodating employer initiatives aimed at
cutting labor costs and increasing productivity. While in some cases
this results in labor-management cooperation and mutual gains, the
evidence suggests that the more frequent from of accommodation
involves labor concessions to management demands. While some
might characterize this outcome as a regulatory failure, I have treated
it as accommodation within the system on the ground that private
sector collective bargaining regimes in both countries were intended
to be responsive to changing economic and labor market conditions.
Differences between Canada and the United States are, perhaps,
most marked in relation to the influence of external factors. Because
labor law in Canada is provincial rather than national, it has been
more sensitive to sub-national swings in political strength and hence
labor law reform has been more volatile. Conservative governments
have taken steps to "Americanize" labor laws, particularly in the
important area of certification procedures, but NDP and most Liberal
governments have resisted that pressure and, indeed, have often
passed legislation that moderately strengthened the private sector
collective bargaining regime. They have been less charitable in
dealing with their own workers. In the United States, there is little
prospect that in the foreseeable future labor will be able to muster
political support for long-needed reforms.
International or transnational legal regimes are ineffective in
directly countering downward pressure on collective bargaining law in
both Canada and the United States. However, the Supreme Court of
Canada has taken international law seriously and used it as a point of
reference in its interpretation of Canadian constitutional law.
Depending on how far they go, this approach could lead to a
constitutionalization of some parts of the collective bargaining regime,
possibly including the right to have effective access to a statutory
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bargain collectively scheme. As well, the court recently identified
trade unions as socially desirable institutions whose activities, like
picketing, are worthy of constitutional protection. There is little
prospect that American courts will protect labor rights to the same
extent.
Finally, social movements in both countries have been active in
opposing globalization and neo-liberal restructuring, although it is
arguably the case that protest actions aimed at regressive private
sector labor law reforms and interference with public sector workers'
collective bargaining rights have been stronger in Canada than in the
United States. Yet, social movement mobilizations or their threat do
not seem to have had much effect on domestic collective bargaining
policy. Social movements, however, have scored some success in
getting social and labor issues onto the table in international trade
talks and in pressuring transnational corporations to take some steps
to monitor labor conditions in their overseas supply networks.
In sum, this study supports the view that free-trade agreements
create conditioning frameworks that generate some downward
economic and institutional pressures on the effectiveness of collective
bargaining laws. These pressures will also operate in the collective
bargaining process itself, often yielding poorer outcomes for
unionized workers. More optimistically, our study shows there are
avenues for resistance, notwithstanding the attempt through free trade
agreements to impose market discipline on politics and law. In
Canada, law has proven to be more resistant to those disciplinary
forces than many would have anticipated, but it would be a dangerous
strategy to rely exclusively on the vagaries of judicial decision-making
to resist the growing commodification of labor. The task of
successfully organizing political and social movement resistance,
however, is a daunting one.

